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In the wake of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. 
Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), which 
formally authorized the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 centralized twenty-two federal agencies with a diverse 
array of missions into a unified, integrated cabinet-level department. DHS was explicitly 
designed to rectify the conditions that enabled the September 11 terror attacks to take 
place. Thus, DHS’s centralized organizational structure was intended to facilitate 
information-sharing and coordination among the numerous government agencies with a 
stake in the homeland security mission. These structural reforms were based on the 
premise that a centralized bureaucratic model is more apt to foster inter-agency 
coordination than is a decentralized bureaucratic model.  
This paper examines the degree to which the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security resolved the information-sharing challenges that ultimately resulted 
in the events of September 11. Chapter 1 evaluates the foremost theoretical perspectives 
on information-sharing to answer the following questions: What is information? What 
does information-sharing mean? How does information-sharing happen? How is 
information-sharing measured? Chapter 2 examines how bureaucracy contributes to, and 
at times exacerbates, the myriad factors that inhibit information-sharing efforts among 
Department of Homeland Security component agencies. Chapter 3 assesses DHS’s 
response to the terror attack in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015 as a case 





model enables and encourages its component agencies to pursue their parochial self-
interests at the detriment of the Department’s overarching mission.  
All three chapters provide critical insight into the ways in which the Department 
of Homeland Security’s organizational structure institutionalizes interagency 
competition, thereby reinforcing factors that impede and discourage effective 
information-sharing. Self-interest ultimately, is what undercuts the unity of effort that the 
centralization of twenty-two disparate agencies was intended to foster. This paper 
concludes that structural reform alone is insufficient—the Department of Homeland 
Security must supplement its centralized organizational structure with an incentives 
system to promote effective, timely, and generous information-sharing among component 
agencies. 
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Intelligence failures are predictably followed by calls for structural reform. 
Likewise, calls for structural reform are predictably focused on improving information-
sharing among intelligence organizations. The structural reforms mandated by the 
National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253) were largely intended to rectify the 
conditions that prompted the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure. However, despite the 
landmark structural improvements achieved through the National Security Act of 1947, 
the United States experienced another intelligence failure on September 11, 2001.  
On September 11, 2001 nineteen al-Qaeda militants hijacked four airplanes and 
carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. The terrorists crashed two 
planes into the World Trade Center in New York City, one plane into the Pentagon near 
Washington, D.C., and one plane in a field in Pennsylvania. The attacks caused the 
deaths of 2,996 people and the injuries of more than 6,000 others. It was deadliest 
terrorist act in U.S. history and the most devastating foreign attack on American soil 
since Pearl Harbor. Moreover, like Pearl Harbor, the September 11 terror attacks 
represented an intelligence failure characterized by inadequate coordination and 
insufficient information-sharing. The September 11 intelligence failure is colloquially 
referred to as a failure to ‘connect the dots.’   
Similar to how the United States responded to the attacks on Pearl Harbor with 
structural reforms, the United States also pursued a massive organizational overhaul in 
the wake of the September 11 terror attacks. On November 25, 2002, President George 
W. Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), 





The Homeland Security Act of 2002 centralized twenty-two federal agencies with a 
diverse array of missions into a unified, integrated cabinet-level department. Importantly, 
the structural reforms were based on the premise that a centralized bureaucratic model is 
more apt to prevent strategic surprise and foster coordination than is a decentralized 
bureaucratic model. Theoretically, centralization, if supported by consistent information-
sharing activities, can help decision-makers create a more precise and comprehensive 
picture of complex threats that involve multiple agencies or departments. 
President Bush articulated the need for a centralized bureaucratic structure with 
homeland security as its primary mission, arguing that “the changing nature of the threats 
facing America requires a new government structure to protect against invisible enemies 
that can strike with a wide variety of weapons” (Bush, 2002). The Department of 
Homeland Security was explicitly designed to facilitate information-sharing and 
coordination among the numerous government agencies with a stake in the homeland 
security mission. Moreover, the structure of DHS was intended to reflect the dynamic 
environment in which it operates. Like the National Security Act of 1947, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 imposed structural reforms upon the U.S. national security 
apparatus to rectify the conditions that prompted an egregious intelligence failure.  
While the centralization of homeland security activities under one bureaucratic 
umbrella presumably offers enhanced coordination, reduced redundancies, and increased 
output, larger bureaucratic structures are not necessarily apt to govern the unique 
priorities and organizational cultures of each component agency. Thus, it is reasonable to 
question the degree to which the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 





September 11. This paper provides critical insight into the structural reforms prescribed 
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as well as subsequent changes. Ultimately, this 
paper demonstrates that the current organizational structure of the Department of 
Homeland Security discourages information-sharing among the Department’s 22 
component agencies, and specifically among those agencies responsible for immigration 
enforcement functions.   
The utility of information-sharing has been a topic of academic research for 
decades, and it continues to receive attention across a range of academic disciplines. 
Recent scholarly work identifies specific factors that promote effective information-
sharing in organizational settings. However, factors influencing inter- and intra-
organizational information-sharing efforts are more complex and interrelated when 
multiple entities or government agencies are involved, such as the homeland security 
enterprise. As such, the information-sharing literature is limited in that it does not 
consider the interplay between factor relationships in a sufficiently inclusive theoretical 
framework. The next three chapters offer substantive research and knowledge from 
personal experience to answer the following question: How does the organizational 
structure of the Department of Homeland Security influence information-sharing among 
component agencies?  
Chapter 1 provides the framework for this thesis with a literature review 
discussing how various academic disciplines apply unique theoretical lenses to the study 
of information-sharing. To better assess how information is shared among and within 
organizations, as well as across organizational boundaries, it is necessary to conduct a 





evaluates key themes and patterns that emerge across academic disciplines to inform a 
comprehensive, multi-theoretical information-sharing framework. This chapter examines 
the foremost theoretical perspectives on information-sharing to answer the following 
questions: What is information? What does information-sharing mean? How does 
information-sharing happen? How is information-sharing measured?  
The literature acknowledges that ‘information’ is a very broad concept, and there 
is currently no consensus on its boundaries and definition (Willem and Buelens, 2007). 
Generally, information manifests in two forms: tangible and intangible. It is important to 
highlight this distinction because the literature suggests that people’s attitudes toward 
information-sharing can be influenced by the form of the information (Feldman and 
March, 1981; Constant et al., 1994). We can gain more clarity about the relative value 
and utility of information when the concept is evaluated from four perspectives: (1) 
information as knowledge, (2) information as a commodity, (3) information as power, 
and (4) information as intelligence. These distinctions reflect four important facets of 
information, all of which have important implications in the homeland security context. 
To significantly improve information-sharing explanatory power, it is important 
to discuss information-sharing as an integration of disciplines, including organizational 
behavior and theory, information systems, psychology, sociology, economics, and 
strategy. Specifically, the focus is placed on seven predominant theories in the 
information-sharing literature: (1) theory of reasoned action, (2) transaction cost 
economics, (3) relational governance theories, including social exchange theory and 
economic exchange theory, (4) social capital theory, (5) contingency theory, (6) resource 





numerous aforementioned theories address factors and conditions that influence 
information-sharing within and across organizations. It is worthwhile to note that these 
factors and conditions are often divergent, complementary, or overlapping, and that they 
each provide a nuanced explanation of a complex and multi-layered process. 
Furthermore, the literature presents the information-sharing process through three 
perspectives: (1) interpersonal, (2) intra-organizational, and (3) inter-organizational 
(Yang and Maxwell, 2011). When evaluating information-sharing in public 
organizations, and especially in the homeland security domain, it is important to consider 
how the three perspectives of information-sharing are both interrelated and, at times, 
interdependent. Moreover, interpersonal information-sharing behaviors become more 
complicated when they are embedded within the contexts of intra- and inter-organization 
information-sharing. Individual attitudes and predilections may interface with 
organizational factors, such as competition and collaboration, which can either encumber 
or promote intra- and inter-organizational information-sharing. Unlike information-
sharing within a single organizational unit, cross-boundary information-sharing efforts 
are far more complicated and multifaceted due to the diversity of missions and interests 
involved. This is particularly important in the context of the Department of Homeland 
Security, as its component agencies often have overlapping or divergent missions and 
priorities.  
Although information-sharing has attracted considerable attention from 
researchers and is widely accepted as an approach to improve organizational 
performance, there is a remarkable absence of research dedicated to measuring the 





sharing endeavors cannot be measured simply by the successful transmission of 
information across organizational boundaries; it is also important to assess whether the 
information is absorbed and utilized effectively within the organization that acquired it 
(Jackson, 2014; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Information-sharing is multi-dimensional, 
and its complexity demands an equally multifaceted evaluation process. The results of the 
structured review in chapter 1 enable a more informed and multi-dimensional discussion 
of information-sharing in chapters 2 and 3.  
In chapter 2, the focus shifts to examining how bureaucracy contributes to, and at 
times exacerbates, the myriad factors that inhibit information-sharing efforts among 
Department of Homeland Security component agencies. These factors highlight the 
enduring difficulty of harmonizing the twenty-two disparate agencies that comprise the 
Department of Homeland Security and give credence to the notion that centralization 
fosters a culture of competition rather than collaboration. 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of how the Department of Homeland 
Security’s centralized bureaucratic structure is intended to support the Department’s 
primary mission and departmental objectives with regard to information-sharing. The 
Department of Homeland Security is unique because its components balance the 
interdependent cultures of law enforcement, domestic intelligence, emergency 
preparedness, and emergency response to facilitate a robust homeland security enterprise. 
However, the Department of Homeland Security is particularly vulnerable to 
contradictory organizational objectives due to the sheer diversity of component 
objectives, which range from short-term emergency response to long-term intelligence 





homeland security mission demands seamless interoperability between component 
agencies.  
Despite the theoretical benefits of a centralized Department of Homeland 
Security, centralization imposes large transaction costs on component agencies as they 
merge and modify their respective activities (Cohen et al., 2006). These costs can 
inadvertently foster competition between components operating in similar or overlapping 
regulatory environments. Ultimately, persistent barriers to effective information-sharing 
are compounded by a bureaucratic model that institutionalizes interagency competition. 
Five key categories of factors that stymie information-sharing activities among DHS 
component agencies are identified: (1) lack of information technology interoperability, 
(2) incongruity of classification standards, (3) overlapping agency jurisdictions and 
missions, (4) overreliance on outcome-centric metrics to quantify achievement, and (5) 
correlation between perceived agency performance and annual budget appropriations. 
The Department of Homeland Security must develop structures and processes that 
address the aforementioned factors and provide incentives or rewards for collaboration, 
consultation, and support for implementing key goals. 
Chapter 3 examines the Department of Homeland Security’s response to the terror 
attack in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015, as a case study to test the 
information-sharing and bureaucracy theoretical frameworks established in chapters 1 
and 2. This case study provides substantive insight into the overarching research 
question: How does the organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security 
influence information-sharing among component agencies? Chapter 3 illustrates how the 





encourages component agencies to pursue their parochial self-interests at the detriment of 
the Department’s overarching mission. 
This case study features a clear example of an information-sharing failure 
between two DHS component agencies on hierarchical parity within the broader DHS 
organizational structure: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In the aftermath of the terror attack in 
San Bernardino, USCIS took three deliberate actions to prevent ICE from obtaining 
information critical to the ongoing investigation: (1) USCIS delayed ICE’s entry into the 
USCIS facility; (2) USCIS prohibited ICE from arresting, detaining, or interviewing 
anyone in the USCIS facility; and (3) USCIS did not share a tangible copy of Mariya 
Chernykh’s A-file with ICE agents. An analysis of these three actions illustrates how the 
present organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security does not 
incentivize information-sharing between component agencies. 
Government agencies must be coerced to share information because bureaucracies 
are explicitly designed to counteract inter-organizational information-sharing. 
Institutional features of the U.S. federal government, such as regulations, oversight 
mechanisms, and organizational cultures, are intended to frustrate integration and prevent 
organizations from becoming too powerful. Arguably, the multiple layers of bureaucracy 
inherent in DHS’s organizational structure stifle opportunities for information-sharing 
between component agencies like USCIS and ICE because components have relatively 
little incentive to overcome the ‘institutional features of the U.S. federal government’ 
(Peled, 2014) that frustrate coordination. This problem is compounded by the fact that no 





immigration challenges, such as information-sharing (Roth, 2017). Without incentives or 
an oversight body to encourage cross-component information-sharing, it is unsurprising 
that the Department of Homeland Security has difficulty coercing USCIS and ICE, and 
all the other components more broadly, to share information voluntarily. 
In the wake of the devastating terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush recognized that the evolving threat landscape necessitated a 
more agile, unified government structure that could better protect the homeland and the 
American people. The Department of Homeland Security was explicitly designed to 
facilitate cooperation and coordination among the numerous government agencies with a 
stake in the homeland security mission. Moreover, the structure of DHS was intended to 
reflect the dynamic environment in which it operates. However, since its inception, the 
Department of Homeland Security has been largely unable to overcome the same 
problems that both preceded and prompted its creation. This case study answers the 
overarching research question with a chilling conclusion: The Department of Homeland 
Security’s organizational structure creates a disincentive for cross-component 
collaboration and information-sharing. Self-interest, ultimately, is what undermines the 







CHAPTER 1: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective 
I. Introduction  
Information-sharing is an important approach to increasing organizational 
efficiency and fostering innovation. The utility of information-sharing has been a topic of 
academic research for decades, and it continues to receive attention across a range of 
academic disciplines. The literature is as vast as it is multidisciplinary, and each 
discipline applies a unique theoretical lens to the study of information-sharing. To better 
assess how information is shared among and within organizations, as well as across 
organizational boundaries, it is critical to first conduct a systematic review of 
predominant theoretical frameworks. This systematic review evaluates key themes and 
patterns that emerge across academic disciplines to inform a comprehensive, multi-
theoretical information-sharing framework. Chapter 1 examines the foremost theoretical 
perspectives on information-sharing to answer the following questions: What is 
information? What does information-sharing mean? How does information-sharing 
happen? How is information-sharing measured? Leaders of massive government 
agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, can improve their approach to 
information-sharing by studying the meaning of information (implicit versus explicit 
knowledge), the four ways in which information assumes a relative value (power, 
knowledge, commodity, and intelligence), the concept of “reasoned action,” as well as 
the concept of “transactions.” The results of this structured review will enable a more 







II. What is Information? 
In the dictionary, ‘information’ is defined as “facts provided or learned about 
something or someone” (“Information,” n.d.). This definition is sufficient for a 
rudimentary conceptualization of information, but it fails to capture the variety and 
nuance of what is being exchanged in an information-sharing partnership. The literature 
acknowledges that information is a very broad concept, and there is currently no 
consensus on its boundaries and definition (Willem and Buelens, 2007). Generally, 
information manifests in two forms: tangible and intangible. Tangible information can be 
thought of as a document, email, or software program, and intangible information can be 
thought of as a skill, experience, or memory (Constant et al., 1994). It is important to 
highlight this distinction because the literature suggests that people’s attitudes toward 
information-sharing can be influenced by the form of the information (Feldman and 
March, 1981; Constant et al., 1994). Form, therefore, is a critical variable in the larger 
conversation about the relative value of information in information-sharing exchanges 
(Klischewski and Scholl, 2008; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Scholl, 1999).  
From a macro perspective, information must be a nebulous concept because the 
value of information can be defined only relative to its user (Marchand, 1990). 
Furthermore, the meaning of information is subject to change over time, so its value and 
utility can vary even for the same user (Ballou et al., 2003). That said, we can gain more 
clarity about the relative value and utility of information when the concept is examined 
from a micro perspective. This involves a meticulous consideration of the context in 
which the information is exchanged between individuals and across organizational 





relative value: (1) information as knowledge, (2) information as a commodity, (3) 
information as power, and (4) information as intelligence. These distinctions reflect four 
important facets of information, all of which have important implications in the homeland 
security context which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.   
 
a. Information as Knowledge 
Like information, knowledge is an ambiguous concept. When discussing 
knowledge, the literature creates two distinctions: explicit and implicit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1966; Van Den Hooff and De Ridder, 2004). Information is considered to be 
explicit knowledge that can be articulated and translated into a tangible form outside of 
the human mind (Stenmark, 2002; Zhang and Dawes, 2006). However, researchers point 
out that information-sharing is not only limited to the exchange of tangible, explicit 
knowledge and information. Rather, information-sharing also encompasses tacit 
(implicit) knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Klischewski and Scholl, 2008; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Scholl, 1999; Van Den Hooff and De Ridder, 2004). The seminal work 
of Polanyi (1966) clarifies that explicit knowledge is objective, rational, and can be 
expressed in words, numbers, formulas, or charts. In contrast, implicit knowledge is 
subjective, experience-based, and difficult to communicate. Implicit knowledge can be 
better understood as know-how, or “practical understanding that enables a firm to 
perform various operations” (Sanchez and Heene 1997, p. 178).  
Understandably, the practical differences between explicit and implicit knowledge 
influence the relative ease with which knowledge can be transferred. Explicit knowledge 





other hand, implicit knowledge is embedded in individuals’ cognition and thus 
entrenched within organizational units (Birkinshaw, Nobel, and Ridderstrale, 2002; 
Szulanski 2000; Willem and Buelens, 2007). As such, individuals are a critical source of 
implicit knowledge and information within organizations. Through their experiences in 
the organization’s key processes, individuals create, organize, and amass knowledge 
(Jarvenpaa and Staples, 2001). The knowledge worker therefore possesses a valuable 
trove of organizational information that is not easily communicated or expressed. Even 
with the codification of information, implicit knowledge and expertise reside within the 
individual and are not accessible for broader consumption unless the individual makes the 
information available (Bock et al., 2005). 
 
b. Information as a Commodity 
Information and knowledge sharing have become increasingly important to 
researchers and practitioners because organizations are now thought to operate in a 
knowledge economy (Haas and Hansen, 2007). In a knowledge economy, the transfer and 
exchange of information is a source of competitive advantage and a driver of 
organizational innovation. Many public-sector organizations create knowledge as their 
core product, provide knowledge to the public as their main activity, or employ workers 
to develop knowledge as their primary responsibility (Starbuck, 1992; Willem and 
Buelens, 2007). In this environment, the quality of information is relevant to its value as a 
commodity because the transmission and exchange of information takes on a more 
transactional role. The source, timeliness, relevance, accuracy, and volume of 





Despite the transactional qualities of an information-sharing framework, it can be 
problematic to refer to knowledge as a commodity because individuals do not view 
information as a monolithic, undifferentiated resource (Constant et al., 1994). Simply, 
there is a correlation between the form of information and its psychological meaning to 
the information possessor. As such, the value of information is inextricably linked to its 
form, manner of presentation, processors, and channel of communication (Feldman and 
March, 1981). Although individuals view tangible information products as a commodity 
in the context of a rational-economic exchange, they do not view expertise as a 
commodity in the same context (Constant et al., 1994; Jarvenpaa and Staples, 2001). 
Rather, individuals associate expertise with personal identity and inner qualities. 
Expertise is “deeply rooted in an individual’s action and experience, as well as in the 
ideals, values, or emotions he or she embraces” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8). 
This raises a dilemma about information as a commodity: knowledge workers 
create, organize, and amass tangible information goods and services, but organizations 
own these products. Additionally, organizations expect employees to extract utility from 
these products to benefit the organization as a whole (Constant et al., 1994). However, 
because expertise is associated with a knowledge worker’s personal identity and self-
worth, the issue of ownership presents a challenging issue. The question of whether 
organizations can reasonably expect or mandate knowledge workers to share expertise 
presents an additional layer of ambiguity to this dilemma. For example, some believe that 
that professional codes of conduct, intellectual property laws, and standard business 





explicitly address this issue through their organizational culture and through precise 
policies (Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001).  
 
c. Information as Power 
Given that information has value, information is an incredible source of power. 
Power can be defined as “the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify 
the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent 
his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not” (Blau, 1964, p. 
115). Recognizing that the transfer and exchange of information is a source of 
competitive advantage in a knowledge economy (Haas and Hansen, 2007), individuals 
may seek to control information to protect their own self-interests rather than the interests 
of the organization (Jarvenpaa and Staples, 2001). Regarded as one of the most, if not the 
most, important organizational asset, knowledge should be carefully managed to avoid 
power games (Argote et al., 2003; Teece, 1998). Power games involve the unjust use of 
power to elevate value, influence, or status (Willem and Buelens, 2007). Because owning 
information within an organization translates to owning power within an organization 
(Ardichvill et al., 2003; Kolekofski and Heminger, 2003; Marks et al., 2008), information 
can be hoarded as an asset to strategically enhance individual status and identity 
(Constant et al., 1994). According to this perspective, information can be understood as a 
form of property, which when surrendered, diminishes an individual’s influence within 







d. Information as Intelligence 
An article published by Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) journal, Studies in 
Intelligence, offers the following guidance for defining the term, ‘intelligence’: 
“Formulating a brief definition of so broad a term as intelligence is like making a 
microscopic portrait of a continent, and the product of this effort is likely to have less 
value than the process of arriving at it” (Bimfort, 1958, p. 75). Quoting the 1955 task 
force on intelligence of the second Herbert Hoover Commission, Former CIA Director 
Allen W. Dulles presented the following definition: “Intelligence deals with all the things 
which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action” (Dulles, 2006, p. 1). 
In effect, intelligence provides a predictive advantage to an organization, enabling it to 
act preemptively and make strategic decisions (Phythian and Gill, 2018).  
Given the complexity and multifaceted nature of the term, ‘information,’ and the 
intentionally narrow scope of this study, intelligence is intended to mean information 
products (such as strategic assessments or subject profiles) that are shared among and 
between U.S. government agencies whose missions primarily involve homeland security. 
While the strategic importance of intelligence as a network of organizations and 
information as a process are central to homeland security, the focus should be on 
intelligence as a product (Lowenthal, 2006). In this context, intelligence can be thought 
of as the tangible result of the processes by which certain types of information are 
required, requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated (Lowenthal, 2006). 
Intelligence is not merely a data dump; it offers value in that the information has been 
analyzed and packaged for a specific customer (Steiner, 2015). The process of evaluation 





deciding to transform and use it as an intelligence product. In this paper, the intelligence 
customer is the homeland security professional who receives and uses the intelligence 
product to make decisions about a course of action.   
Intelligence collection is an essential and preliminary step in the creation of 
intelligence products (Ganor, 2005; Lowenthal, 2006; Steiner, 2015; Clark, 2017). There 
are six basic intelligence collection disciplines that yield intelligence products for 
customers (“What is intelligence?,” n.d.). The most familiar type of collection is human 
intelligence (HUMINT), which refers to information collected by human sources about a 
target’s intentions and capabilities. In the homeland security context, many federal, state, 
and local law enforcement agencies are major HUMINT collectors. Law enforcement 
agencies rely heavily on human sources, referred to as confidential informants, to provide 
intelligence that can be used to disrupt terrorist plots (Steiner, 2015). In addition to 
HUMINT, there are five forms of technical intelligence collection techniques: signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature 
intelligence (MASINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), and geospatial intelligence 
(GEOINT). Technical collection methods are the best way to gather enormous quantities 
of information on enemy capabilities and fixed terrorism targets (Steiner, 2015). 
Fundamentally, the deployment of intelligence collection disciplines is driven by the 
nature of and our access to the target. As such, intelligence products can either be based 
on a single type of collection (single-source) or based on all available types of collection 
(all-source) (“What is intelligence?,” n.d.).  
From the customer’s perspective, intelligence products can be categorized into 





intelligence, (2) operational intelligence, and (3) strategic intelligence (Steiner, 2015). 
Tactical intelligence refers to intelligence used for planning or directing individual 
operations in the short-term. This form of intelligence enables tactical units to achieve a 
positional advantage over their adversaries (Clark, 2017). Law enforcement agencies 
consider tactical intelligence to mean any information that directly leads to an arrest or 
builds a case against a subject. Tactical intelligence involves specific details like dates, 
times, locations, weapons, and methods that facilitate immediate utility (Ganor, 2005). 
Operational intelligence refers to intelligence that may be relevant in pursuit of long-term 
goals like arrests or prosecutions. This form of intelligence focuses on the capabilities 
and intentions of adversaries and is required for the planning and execution of specific 
operations (Clark, 2017). The key distinction is that operational intelligence has no 
immediate utility. Strategic intelligence is highly sought after by policymakers who make 
decisions concerning long-term national and international issues. Strategic intelligence 
can be thought of as the intelligence in support of a broader strategy, including the 
identities of high-value subjects, motives, hierarchies, ideologies, and methods (Ganor, 
2005). 
 
III. What Does Information-Sharing Mean? 
Information-sharing within and across organizations improves organizational 
performance and efficiency (Lesser and Storck, 2001), promotes competitive advantage 
(Argote and Ingram, 2000; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and 
Takeguchi, 1995), fosters organizational learning (Argote, 1999), and stimulates 





from researchers and practitioners alike. Recent scholarly work endeavors to identify 
specific factors that promote effective information-sharing in organizational settings. 
However, factors influencing inter- and intra-organizational information-sharing efforts 
are more complex and interrelated when multiple entities or government agencies are 
involved (Yang and Maxwell, 2011). As such, the information-sharing literature is 
limited in that it does not consider the interplay between factor relationships in a 
sufficiently inclusive theoretical framework.  
In asking the fundamental question, What does information-sharing mean?, it is 
beneficial to integrate the predominant theoretical lenses from a variety of academic 
disciplines to significantly improve information-sharing explanatory power. Compared to 
a single-theory framework, a multi-theory framework can provide more comprehensive 
insights into intra- and inter-organizational information-sharing because it is better suited 
to perceive multi-faceted influential factors (Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Since 
information-sharing behaviors are influenced not only by personal motivations but also 
by contextual forces (Yoo and Torrey, 2002), the study of information-sharing should be 
envisioned as an integration of disciplines, including organizational behavior and theory, 
information systems, psychology, sociology, economics, and strategy. In the following 
paragraphs, the predominant theories underpinning the diverse array of information-
sharing literature are presented to support an integrated theoretical analysis of homeland 








a. Theory of Reasoned Action 
The theory of reasoned action was introduced by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as an 
improvement over information integration theory. The theory of reasoned action assumes 
that individuals are rational and will make systematic use of the information available to 
them (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Bock and Kim, 2001). The theory is widely accepted in 
social psychology to explain human behavior and can be a useful model to explain 
information-sharing behaviors in organizations (Davis et al., 1989). Critically, the theory 
of reasoned action assumes that information-sharing behavior occurs at the individual 
level (Bock and Kim, 2001). Additionally, it suggests that performance of a behavior can 
be predicted by three elements: (1) attitude toward the behavior, (2) subjective norms, 
and (3) behavioral intention (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Jolaee, 2014). The literature 
proposes that subjective norms are likely to affect behavioral intentions both directly and 
indirectly through attitude (Bock et al., 2005; Kim and Lee, 1995; Koys and Decotiis, 
1991; Kurland, 1995; Mathieson, 1991; Thompson et al., 1991).  
The theory of reasoned action is an important lens that contributes to our 
collective understanding of why knowledge workers engage or choose not to engage in 
information-sharing behaviors. This is key because the literature suggests that 
information-sharing is unnatural, and that hoarding information and looking suspiciously 
upon information from others is a natural human tendency (Davenport, 1996; Bock and 
Kim, 2001). Importantly, numerous studies suggest that the degree of an individual’s 
positive feelings about information-sharing significantly impacts their intent to share 
information (Kuo and Young, 2008; Kolekofski and Heminger, 2003; Bock et al., 2005; 





between attitude and information-sharing intention means that individuals share 
information when they have positive attitudes about information-sharing (Jolaee, 2014; 
Bock and Kim, 2001).   
 
b. Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction cost economics considers the factors that govern economic 
transactions (Williamson, 1985). Inherent in this theoretical framework is the assumption 
that individuals are opportunistic and will choose to share information when such an 
approach can reduce uncertainty and when transaction costs are low (Tan et al., 2010). 
The variables of uncertainty and transaction costs are important to a broader 
understanding of what may motivate individuals to share information. On the other hand, 
transaction cost economics can also explain why partners would be motivated to withhold 
information. As such, information-sharing is most likely to occur when individuals 
perceive that incentives exceed costs (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978).  
Even when information-sharing is framed in the context of contributing to a 
collective good, the decision is ultimately a calculation of the perceived costs and 
benefits (Jian and Jeffres, 2006; Marks et al., 2008). Assuming that individuals are 
rational and self-interested, they will seek to maximize individual benefits and minimize 
individual costs (Jian and Jeffres, 2006; Draaijer, 2008). Given the value of information 
as an asset or capital, partners may use the advantage strategically to control the 
behaviors of their partners (Kim et al., 2006). Uncertainty and transaction costs maintain 
information asymmetry and limit opportunities for partners to exploit the exchange 





transaction cost economics literature suggests that formal structures, like contracts and 
government institutions, reduce the possibility of opportunism by limiting uncertainty in 
transactions (Tan et al., 2010; Porterfield et al., 2010; Grover and Saeed, 2007). In 
addition to equitable compensation, formal structures could integrate incentives or 
penalties to institutionalize the importance of information sharing (Grover and Saeed, 
2007; Porterfield et al., 2010).  
 
c. Relational Governance Theories, Including Social Exchange Theory and 
Economic Exchange Theory 
Relational governance theories conceptualize information-sharing as a necessarily 
reciprocal activity that serves, primarily, to improve transactional relationships (Nyaga et 
al., 2010). Such relationships create a framework for enhanced inter-organizational 
cooperation, which could eventually lead to increased organizational efficiencies (Wei et 
al., 2012). Recent studies suggest that information-sharing between organizations is 
heavily influenced by good inter-organizational relationships based on core features like 
trust, commitment and shared vision (Li and Lin, 2006). The core supposition of 
relational governance theory is that partners are operating in an environment of trust 
where the benefits of information-sharing unquestionably outweigh the benefits of 
opportunism (Kim et al., 2006). The environment of trust, demonstrated through mutual 
reliance or interdependency, is reinforced by informal structures, such as social controls 
(Patnayakuni et al., 2006). Relational governance theories assign considerable, and 
arguably disproportionate, emphasis to the benefits of mutual reliance with the 





Because information-sharing can be understood as a distinct type of social 
interaction among individuals, it is important to consider theories that explain the social 
interaction of people, such as social exchange theory and economic exchange theory.  
Organization theorists and behavioralists have challenged the assumptions underlying 
economic theories like transaction cost economics as being too narrowly focused on 
opportunism. (Jones, 1983; Perrow, 1981). Conversely, according to the economic 
exchange theory, individuals will behave by rational self-interest. Thus, information-
sharing will occur when expected rewards exceed perceived costs (Bock and Kim, 2001; 
Kelley and Thibaut, 1978; Constant, et al., 1994). Additionally, researchers argue that 
social exchange theory may be a more useful theoretical lens for the examination of inter- 
and intra-organizational alliances (Graham, 1988). Specifically, several researchers found 
that social networks help to generate positive attitudes about the sharing of information 
and knowledge within an organization. (Kim and Lee, 2006; Kolekofski and Heminger, 
2003; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Some social exchange theorists suggest that 
transaction cost economics could be supplemented by social context to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of organizational relationships (Cook and Emerson, 1978).  
Constant et al. (1994) suggest that social exchange and economic exchange 
theories are similar in that they both consider reciprocity to be an important motivational 
factor in promoting information-sharing behaviors within organizations. Furthermore, 
rational economic transactions, such as information-sharing, are embedded in social 
relations that generate trust and discourage opportunism (Granovetter, 1985). Like 
economic theories, social exchange theory predicts that information-sharing behaviors 





because social exchange theory also investigates intangible costs and intangible benefits 
(Hung and Chuang, 2009). However, an important distinction is that economic exchange 
theory primarily concerns extrinsic benefits, such as monetary rewards or promotions, 
while social exchange theory primarily concerns intrinsic benefits, such as feelings of 
gratitude or trust (Blau, 1964; Bock and Kim, 2001).  
   
d. Social Capital Theory 
Social capital theory, like social exchange theory, is often used to explain 
information-sharing behavior within and across organizations. The term ‘social capital’ 
refers to the resources embedded within, available through, and derived from networks of 
individuals, communities, networks, or societies (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Chang 
and Chuang, 2011). In the context of information-sharing, social capital theory suggests 
that social capital is a necessary condition for the exchange of information (Hung and 
Chuang, 2009; Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), examine social 
capital through three categories: the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions of 
social capital. The structural dimension describes the configuration of linkages between 
people or units and focuses on the broader patterns of relationships found within 
organizations (Mäkelä, 2007; Chang and Chuang, 2011). The relational dimension 
denotes the nature of the linkages between people or units and includes elements such as 
trust, norms, identity, obligations, and expectations (Mäkelä, 2007; Chang and Chuang, 
2011). The cognitive dimension is characterized by shared paradigms, codes, languages, 
and systems of meaning that facilitate a common understanding or perspective within a 





While social exchange theory can be used to identify cost and benefit factors 
affecting the information-sharing framework, social capital theory can supplement the 
examination to account for the moderating influence of contextual social capital factors 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Constant et al., 1994). Specifically, contextual social capital 
factors like trust, norms, and identification impact the conditions for information-sharing 
(Cohen and Prusak 2001; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and can either strengthen or 
weaken the effects of cost and benefit factors on information-sharing behavior 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2005). A pivotal study by Chow and Chan (2008) empirically 
analyzes the influence of social capital on organizational information-sharing. They 
found that higher levels of social networks and shared goals directly influence attitudes 
and subjective norms about information-sharing, and indirectly influence intentions to 
share information (Chow and Chan, 2008).   
 
e. Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory suggests that the structures and processes that facilitate 
information-sharing are influenced by internal and external environments. Thus, 
organizational design should mirror the environment in which it operates (Woodward, 
1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974; Persson, 1978, 
1995; Donaldson, 2001; Butterman et al., 2008; Flynn et al., 2010). Although 
information-sharing yields numerous organizational benefits, it can concurrently increase 
transaction risk and uncertainty, as higher degrees of transparency can inadvertently 
invite opportunistic behavior (Yigitbasioglu, 2010). Contingency theory states that such 





amount of uncertainty and rate of change in an environment impact the development of 
internal organizational structures and mechanisms (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Yigitbasioglu, 2010). The underlying assumption in contingency theory is that 
organizations perform better when they share information in favorable environments 
compared to when they share information in unfavorable environments (Wong et al., 
2012).  
One of the distinct benefits of this theory is that it prescribes an adaptive approach 
to information-sharing, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach (Stock et al., 2000; Grover 
and Saeed, 2007; Caridi et al., 2010). In effect, there is no universal or optimal way to 
structure an organization or to make decisions because organizational effectiveness is 
contingent on the influence of internal and external variables like technology, culture, and 
the environment (Bastian and Andreas, 2012). Critics of contingency theory point out that 
internal and external variables are constantly evolving, and that an organization only 
remains in fit temporarily until contingency variables lead the organization into misfit 
once again. Though the theory claims that organizations in fit experience higher 
performance than those in misfit, critics argue that the contingency variables themselves 
change so that the organizational structural change does not effectively produce fit 
(Donaldson, 2001, 2006; Abba et al., 2018). 
 
f. Resource Dependence Theory 
Like contingency theory, resource dependence theory recognizes the influence of 
external factors on organizational behaviors (Hillman et al., 2009). Resource dependence 





sustained access to resources and therefore act to reduce environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory also suggests that organizations will seek to 
diversify access to resources to maintain their autonomy and decrease their dependency 
on external factors (Donaldson, 2001). However, organizations cannot be truly 
autonomous because they are constrained by a network of interdependencies with other 
organizations (Pfeffer, 1987). As such, organizational attempts to manage external 
interdependencies are never completely successful and inevitably produce new patterns 
of external dependence and interdependence (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer, 1987).  
A critical element of organizational efforts to manage external dependencies and 
resource uncertainties is the concept of power, which refers to control over vital resources 
(Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Resource dependence theory posits that organizations will 
often attempt to assert control over resources to both reduce others’ power and increase 
their own power over others (Hillman et al., 2009). In the context of information-sharing, 
the degree to which organizations are dependent on their partners for resources may 
explain such organization’s willingness to share information. (Patnayakuni et al., 2006). 
As such, the intensity of information-sharing practices between organizations should 
reflect the level of dependency asymmetry. (Vijayasarathy, 2010; Yigitbasioglu, 2010). 
Dependency asymmetry may exacerbate power imbalances between partners and 
introduce an avenue for opportunism at the detriment of the exchange relationship 








g. Resource-Based View, Including Knowledge-Based View 
The resource-based theoretical lens considers how an organization’s distinctive 
competencies can be important sources of heterogeneity that uniquely contribute to the 
organization’s competitive advantage (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989). The resource-based view assigns considerable importance to an 
organization’s resources, which can be defined as anything thought of as a strength or 
weakness of a given organization (Wernerfelt, 1984). In the context of information-
sharing, information is an organization’s most valuable resource and can be used to 
generate increased rents (Peteraf, 1993). The generation of rents is the focal point of 
analysis for determining an organization’s competitive advantage (Porter and Millar, 
1985). Notably, the resource-based view prioritizes the ownership of inimitable 
resources, like information, to maintain a competitive advantage and underplays 
opportunities for rent generation through collaborative endeavors (Peteraf, 1993).  
An increasing interest in knowledge as a strategic resource led scholars to develop 
the knowledge-based version of the resource-based view. According to the knowledge-
based view of an organization (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996), knowledge enhances the 
coordinative and integrative capabilities of organizations and is the cornerstone of an 
organization’s competitive advantage. As such, knowledge is a focal point of analysis in 
determining an organization’s value. The knowledge-based theory emphasizes the 
content of organizational activities, such as information-sharing, as an important indicator 
of performance (Argote et al., 2003). Additionally, the theory suggests that organizations 
are social communities that specialize in the creation, development, and exchange of 





of information ownership is again problematic as knowledge is created, organized, and 
amassed by knowledge workers who apply knowledge to carry out their responsibilities 
(Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Bock et al., 2005). 
Critics of the resource-based theoretical lens argue that an emphasis on insularity 
and resource protection neglects to consider the impact of integration with external 
resources to improve internal routines and processes (Barney et al., 2011). While 
traditional perspectives of the resource based-view envision organizations as 
independent, autonomous organizations (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), more recent literature examines the competitive advantages of 
organizations participating in networked environments (Lavie, 2006; Kogut, 2000). 
Lavie’s (2006) extension of Barney’s (1991) framework of resource-based competitive 
advantage is instructive because he introduces social network theories to analyze the 
impact of network structure on organizational performance. Lavie’s (2006) research 
suggests that organizations can extract value from resources that are not owned or 
controlled through participation in a social network.  
The numerous aforementioned theories and literatures address factors and 
conditions that impact information-sharing within and across organizations. It is 
worthwhile to note that these factors and conditions are often divergent, complementary, 
or overlapping, and that they each provide a nuanced explanation of an admittedly 
complicated process. The assessments of homeland security information-sharing in 
chapters 2 and 3 will synthesize prior research across academic disciplines to examine 





This will provide a more comprehensive and diverse framework to evaluate information-
sharing efficacy in the homeland security context.  
 
IV. How Does Information-Sharing Happen?  
Technological advances have significantly enhanced the capacity to share 
information within and across organizations. Information can be transferred from the 
possessor to the recipient through a variety of mechanisms, including by telephone, fax, 
email, web-enabled portals, and face-to-face contact, among many others (Kembro et al., 
2014). A significant amount of research has been dedicated to the challenges associated 
with integrating heterogeneous information systems with inconsistent data structures 
(Atabakhsh et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007; Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; 
Klischewski and Scholl, 2008; Lam, 2005; Pardo et al., 2004; Zhang and Dawes, 2006). 
While technological capabilities can pose significant challenges to information-sharing 
within and across organizations (Fedorowicz et al., 2007; Lam, 2005), researchers claim 
that such challenges pale in comparison to challenges in organizational structure and 
policy (Atabakhsh et al., 2004; Brazelton and Gorry, 2003; Landsbergen and Wolken, 
2001). Moreover, technology interoperability in the information-sharing context presents 
a research topic of its own and is out of the scope of this paper.  
The literature presents the information-sharing process through three perspectives: 
(1) interpersonal, (2) intra-organizational, and (3) inter-organizational (Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011). Each perspective contributes to a broader discussion about personal 
motivations and contextual forces (Yoo and Torrey, 2002) that ultimately influence how 





foundation for discussions in chapters 2 and 3 about how homeland security information 
is shared between component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security and 
among other relevant government agencies.  
When evaluating information-sharing in public organizations, it is important to 
consider how the three perspectives of information-sharing are both interrelated and, at 
times, interdependent. Interpersonal relationships are social associations among 
individuals, and research at the interpersonal level focuses on individual behaviors such 
as motivations of, approaches to, and channels for, an individual to share information 
with others (Yang and Maxwell, 2011). In a seminal study, Bock et al. (2005) suggest 
that interpersonal relationships, characterized as mutual social exchange relationships, are 
important in driving information-sharing intentions and behaviors. The correlation also 
has value in reverse: information-sharing behavior is employed as an approach to 
strengthen social associations between information givers and receivers (Marshall and 
Bly, 2004; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). The knowledge management literature depicts this 
relationship as a cycle in which trust and information-sharing are both an antecedent and 
a consequence of each other (Piderit et al., 2011). Strong interpersonal relationships are a 
necessary element of social exchange theory and economic exchange theory, which both 
consider reciprocity to be an important motivational factor in promoting information-
sharing behaviors within and across organizations.  
However, interpersonal information-sharing behaviors become more complicated 
when they are embedded within the contexts of intra- and inter-organization information-
sharing. Information-sharing between two individuals acting alone is fundamentally 





social and organizational context (Constant et al., 1994). Individual attitudes and 
predilections may interface with organizational factors, such as competition and 
collaboration, which can either encumber or promote intra- and inter-organizational 
information-sharing. This provides critical insight for research into larger, bureaucratic 
information-sharing frameworks. Information-sharing among and between agencies 
within a single, centralized organization can ultimately become entrenched in an even 
broader inter-organizational framework. (Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007, 2009; 
Klischewski and Scholl, 2006; Pardo and Tayi, 2007; Zhang and Dawes, 2006). This is 
especially pertinent for research about homeland security information-sharing, which, by 
the nature of its gravity, must occur in a timely, precise, and generous manner.  
This is challenging for research into intra- and inter-organizational information 
sharing because all three perspectives must be considered both individually and 
collectively. The consideration should ideally include factors that are unique to each 
perspective and an examination of how those unique factors interface within the 
comprehensive information-sharing environment. As the network of participating 
organizations grows, the factors influencing inter-organizational information-sharing 
become more diversified and complex (Gil-Garcia et al., 2005). Unlike information-
sharing within a single organizational unit, cross-boundary information-sharing efforts 
are far more complicated and multifaceted due to the diversity of missions and interests 
involved. This becomes problematic when individuals and organizations have conflicting 







V. How is Information-Sharing Measured? 
Although information-sharing has attracted considerable attention from 
researchers and is widely accepted as an approach to improve organizational 
performance, there is a remarkable absence of research dedicated to measuring the 
effectiveness of information-sharing efforts. Furthermore, debates about the value and 
efficacy of information-sharing efforts are stunted without clear data to inform empirical 
assessments. This is especially pertinent to the sharing of tacit information, which may 
not be readily observable or trackable (Yi, 2009). Objective and defensible approaches to 
measure the impacts of information-sharing efforts would allow for future comparisons 
of the costs associated with supporting such efforts (Jackson, 2014).   
The economics literature provides a theoretical foundation for efforts to quantify 
and measure information-sharing. Researchers have examined how the value of 
information can be evaluated in the context of business decisions. This approach is 
convenient because performance outcomes in the private sector are primarily concerned 
with monetary profit, which is easily quantifiable. Information-sharing measurement 
techniques involve efforts to quantify how decision quality improves with access to 
additional information (McCarthy, 1956; Feltham, 1968). Additionally, ‘options thinking’ 
describes how access to more information changes the relative attractiveness of different 
choices that could be made, as well as the entire decision space within which choices are 
made (Conrad, 1980; Felli and Hazen, 1997). Outcome measures in business focus on 
how information affects decision quality, and how decision quality in turn impacts 





Fundamentally, evaluation efforts measure the degree to which a desired outcome 
was achieved. At the core of this premise is the existence of a ‘desired outcome’ that can 
be clearly articulated. In the context of information-sharing, ‘desired outcomes’ are 
difficult to quantify for a variety of reasons (Jackson, 2014). The success of information-
sharing endeavors cannot be measured simply by the successful transmission of 
information across organizational boundaries; it is also important to assess whether the 
information is absorbed and utilized effectively within the organization that acquired it 
(Jackson, 2014; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Furthermore, the sharing of different forms of 
information involves different social costs and benefits, and evaluation efforts should 
ideally consider employees’ perspectives on information-sharing (Constant et al., 1994). 
Outcome-centric evaluation measures place a disproportionate emphasis on the products 
of information-sharing and largely ignore the processes that yielded the successful 
transfer (Yi, 2009; Huysman and de Wit, 2002).  
Despite this significant challenge, researchers have developed systematic ways of 
assessing the effects of information-sharing programs and processes to determine such 
programs’ and processes’ relative value. Jackson (2014) categorizes these methods 
according to their assessments of four key effects: (1) the process, referring to whether a 
program or process is established or functioning effectively, (2) output, referring to what 
products or services the program or process is intended to produce, (3) outcomes, 
referring to how such products or services affect the organization’s desired outcome, and 
(4) efficiency, referring to whether the costs of the aforementioned products or services 





flexibility of this methodology allows for its application in a variety of information-
sharing environments.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Information-sharing involves more than the simple transmission of information 
from one entity to another. Rather, it is a process of exchanging and processing 
information in a way that enables the knowledge of one entity to be integrated into 
another. Information-sharing is multi-dimensional, and its complexity demands an 
equally multifaceted examination from multiple theoretical perspectives. This chapter 
presented the predominant theoretical lenses that researchers have used to explain how 
individuals and organizations share information. This structured effort demonstrates how 
the study of information-sharing should be envisioned as an integration of disciplines, 
including organizational behavior and theory, information systems, psychology, 
sociology, economics, and strategy. Chapter 1 addressed fundamental questions that 
underpin information-sharing activities, including: What is information? What does 
information-sharing mean? How does information-sharing happen? How is information-
sharing measured? Chapter 2 builds upon this foundation to assess how bureaucracy 
contributes to, and at times exacerbates, the myriad factors that inhibit information-






CHAPTER 2: Bureaucracy and Homeland Security 
 
I. Introduction 
In response to the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and formally authorized the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In his proposal to create the Department of 
Homeland Security, President George W. Bush articulated that “America needs a single, 
unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats 
and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future” (Bush, 2002). 
President Bush proposed to integrate twenty-two federal agencies with a diverse array of 
missions into a single department to rectify the federal government’s uncoordinated and 
inadequate response to the September 11 attacks and protect the nation against emerging 
terrorist threats. However, while the centralization of homeland security activities under 
one bureaucratic umbrella presumably offers enhanced coordination, reduced 
redundancies, and increased output, larger bureaucratic structures are not necessarily apt 
to govern the unique interests and organizational cultures of each component.  
Thus, it is reasonable to question the degree to which the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security resolved the information-sharing challenges that 
ultimately resulted in the events of September 11, 2001. This chapter will examine how 
bureaucracy contributes to, and at times exacerbates, the myriad factors that inhibit 
information-sharing efforts among Department of Homeland Security component 
agencies. First, this chapter evaluates how the Department of Homeland Security’s 
centralized bureaucratic structure supports the Department’s primary mission and 





address how persistent barriers to effective information-sharing are compounded by a 
bureaucratic model that institutionalizes interagency competition. Applied and 
understood in tandem, these factors highlight the enduring difficulty of harmonizing the 
twenty-two disparate agencies that comprise the Department of Homeland Security and 
give credence to the notion that centralization fosters a culture of competition rather than 
collaboration. The historical evolution of the Department of Homeland Security since 
2002 has not effectively produced a single, unified homeland security structure that 
accomplishes the original goals of the agency, which, as articulated in the Department’s 
authorizing legislation, call for information-sharing and coordination among the 22 
government agencies with a stake in the homeland security mission. The barriers to 
effective information-sharing, including lack of information interoperability, incongruity 
of classification standards, overlapping agency jurisdictions and missions, and 
overreliance on outcome-centric metrics to qualify achievement have proved more 
powerful than the rhetorical dedication to common mission and purpose. 
  
II. Background 
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to “ensure a homeland 
that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our Mission,” 
2016). DHS expounds its mission by defining five departmental objectives: (1) prevent 
terrorism and enhance security, (2) secure and manage our borders, (3) enforce and 
administer our immigration laws, (4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, and (5) ensure 
resilience to disasters (“Our Mission,” 2016). The diversity of these objectives is a 





homeland security enterprise, as well as the variation of missions among component 
agencies. Importantly, when agencies were transferred to the nascent Department of 
Homeland Security, they retained their legacy mandates and absorbed new homeland 
security statutory responsibilities. Thus, the new bureaucratic structure forced these 
agencies to reorient their limited resources to accommodate for both sets of mandates and 
reconcile conflicting organizational goals (Cohen et al., 2006).  In this sense, 
centralization resulted in twenty-two unique agencies with split loyalties between legacy 
missions and new homeland security responsibilities. Today, these split loyalties 
reinforce cultural differences and competing interests among component agencies. 
The bureaucracy literature contends that as a bureaucratic organization expands 
both vertically and horizontally, the formal, hierarchical structure of bureaucracy can 
create barriers that impede information-sharing efforts (Creed et al., 1996; Tsai, 2002; 
Argote et al., 2000; Willem and Buelens, 2007; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). The 
multiplicity of external forces that exert control over the activities and priorities of DHS 
component agencies results in a complex network of governance (Fountain, 2013). 
Competing or contradictory demands from authority figures such as component chiefs, 
the DHS Cabinet Secretary, Congressional policymakers, and the President of the United 
States may frustrate DHS component agencies’ abilities to faithfully carry out policy and 
operations. It is worth noting that the different components of DHS report to a plethora of 
different congressional authorities. More than 100 congressional committees, 
subcommittees, and caucuses conduct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security, 
and each entity can have contradictory expectations and priorities for the Department. 





organizational cultures, which impede information-sharing across component agencies.  
In addition to competing interests and goals, component agencies can also have different 
authority figures, which may detract from collaboration, mutual aid arrangements, and 
resource sharing (Caudle, 2005). The Department of Homeland Security is particularly 
vulnerable to contradictory organizational objectives due to the sheer diversity of 
component objectives, which range from short-term emergency response to long-term 
intelligence gathering. Despite these contradictory priorities, the gravity of the 
overarching homeland security mission demands seamless information-sharing activities 
between component agencies.   
Compared to other Cabinet-level Departments, the Department of Homeland 
Security is unique because its components balance the interdependent cultures of law 
enforcement, domestic intelligence, emergency preparedness, and emergency response to 
facilitate a robust homeland security enterprise. As such, information-sharing among and 
within DHS components can involve communications, notifications, and alerts before, 
during, and after an emergency (Jackson, 2014). The scope of this paper focuses on 
information-sharing before an emergency, or “left of boom,” which is a military idiom 
that refers to efforts to disrupt and dismantle militant networks before such networks can 
manufacture and plant bombs. The term “left of boom” was popularized by Doug Laux, a 
former case officer for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who used it in his memoir 
to describe the intelligence activities that precede and ideally prevent terrorist plots (Laux 
and Pezzullo, 2016). In the context of homeland security information-sharing, activities 
left of boom are generally carried out by DHS components whose organizational 





and Immigration Services (USCIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) (Jackson et al., 2009). 
Additionally, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is responsible for the 
timely dissemination of information among DHS components and other public and 
private partners to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient (“Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis,” 2018).  
Former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller articulates 
the importance of the symbiosis of intelligence collection and law enforcement activities 
in the homeland security effort: “Splitting the law enforcement and the intelligence 
functions would lead both agencies fighting the war on terrorism with one hand tied 
behind their backs. The distinct advantage we gain by having intelligence and law 
enforcement together would be lost in more layers and greater stovepiping of 
information, not to mention the difficulty of transitioning safely to a new entity while 
terrorists seek to do us harm” (“Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community,” 
2004). Law enforcement operations, such as the USSS’ efforts to combat money 
laundering and ICE’s investigations into antiquities theft, increasingly involve domestic 
intelligence activities. The evolution of traditional law enforcement operations to what is 
colloquially referred to as ‘intelligence-led policing’ indicates that domestic intelligence 
is a burgeoning asset in the homeland security enterprise (Jackson et al., 2009).  
Several DHS components, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), CBP, TSA, USCIS, ICE, and the USSS comprise the “domestic IC” (Marks, 





intelligence for consumption within their respective agencies. Government agencies 
responsible for law enforcement, border protection, intelligence, and military functions 
contribute to the domestic IC through the prevention and mitigation of threats (Howitt 
and Pangi, 2003; Falkenrath, 2001; Caudle, 2005). In effect, each agency is responsible 
for a certain domain of the homeland security enterprise and has the appropriate 
resources to collect information within that domain (Jackson et al., 2009). However, the 
proliferation of intelligence activities in different domains of the domestic IC has 
generated uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of each agency within the 
broader homeland security effort, as well as concerns about data quality. DHS’s 
comprehensive intelligence capabilities and sizeable law enforcement workforce support 
an intelligence-driven approach to homeland security operations, but such a diverse 
network of autonomous components makes the creation of uniform standards and 
common practices to facilitate the sharing of high-quality information very difficult 
(Jackson et al., 2009). 
 Though the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was intended to 
resolve the intelligence failures associated with September 11, many scholars question 
whether the massive centralization of twenty-two disparate agencies under one, unified 
homeland security bureaucracy achieved this goal. Centralization certainly offers certain 
benefits that help to streamline information-sharing activities, but Peled (2014) argues 
that government agencies must be coerced to share information because bureaucracies are 
explicitly designed to counteract inter-organizational information-sharing. He maintains 
that the institutional features of the U.S. federal government, such as regulations, 





and prevent organizations from becoming too powerful (Peled, 2014). Moreover, 
information flows are strictly regulated in the bureaucratic model, which further restricts 
opportunities for integration (Wheatley, 2006; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). On the other 
hand, some scholars consider centralization to be beneficial for improving coordination, 
reducing redundancies, and increasing efficiencies (Cohen et al., 2006).  
Despite the theoretical benefits of a centralized Department of Homeland 
Security, centralization imposes large transaction costs on component agencies as they 
merge and modify their respective activities (Cohen et al., 2006). These costs can 
inadvertently foster competition between components operating in similar or overlapping 
regulatory environments. Bureaucratic rivalries within a larger organization are 
counterproductive when one entity seeks to promote itself over others, and individual 
bureaucrats who lose power and authority are less likely to adopt new goals and interests 
associated with the reorganization (Cohen et al., 2006). The literature acknowledges that 
government officials are selfish actors who primarily seek to increase their agency’s 
reputation and autonomy (Kraemer and King, 1986; Ardichvill et al., 2003; Constant et 
al., 1994; Jarvenpaa and Staples, 2001; Jian and Jeffres, 2006; Kolekofski and Heminger, 
2003; Marks et al., 2008; Yang and Maxwell, 2011; Peled, 2014).  
 
III. Barriers to Effective Information-Sharing  
In spite of the Department of Homeland Security’s centralized organizational 
structure, several persistent barriers impede effective information-sharing between 
component agencies. These barriers can be organized into five key categories: (1) Lack of 





Overlapping agency jurisdictions and missions, (4) Overreliance on outcome-centric 
metrics to quantify achievement, and (5) Correlation between perceived agency 
performance and annual budget appropriations. The following paragraphs illustrate how 
these categories of factors are intimately related to the Department’s organizational 
design and give credence to the notion that centralization fosters a culture of competition 
rather than collaboration.       
 
a. Lack of Information Technology Interoperability 
Electronic data systems are not integrated between DHS component agencies. 
Because DHS components have unique missions, their information technology (IT) 
systems have adapted to cater to the specific needs of analysts and personnel in the field. 
As such, the evolution of systems and databases may be helpful for individual 
components, but may be incompatible with the data systems of other agencies. The 
bureaucracy literature suggests that agency leaders invest in data integration only if it 
furthers their own agency’s interests (Krause and Douglas, 2005; Schneider and Ingram, 
1990; Peled, 2014). For example, TSA maintains the No-Fly List and Selectee List, two 
databases that accumulate passenger data and restrict access to commercial air travel 
(Jackson et al, 2009). The information in these databases can be helpful for a number of 
other component agencies whose missions involve protecting the border in some 
capacity, including the USCG, CBP, ICE, and USCIS. Unfortunately, department-wide 
IT interoperability is unrealistic because datasets are often duplicated, fragmented, or 





The Office of Inspector General recently audited DHS’s data strategy and found 
that as of April 2017, DHS was in the process of implementing only four of 23 strategic 
objectives in its Enterprise Data Strategy (“Improvements Needed to Promote DHS 
Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-Wide Data Goals,” 2017). Enterprise data is 
data created, managed, or maintained within DHS that is common to, or shared among, 
multiple DHS entities. (“Directive Number 103-01: Enterprise Data Management 
Policy,” 2014). The report highlights DHS’s inadequate progress in executing policies 
that would otherwise improve agency data quality, enable digital information-sharing 
across components, secure data platforms, and build a data workforce. While 
technological capabilities can pose significant challenges to information-sharing efforts 
within and across organizations (Fedorowicz et al., 2007; Lam, 2005), researchers claim 
that such challenges pale in comparison to challenges in organizational structure and 
policy (Atabakhsh et al., 2004; Brazelton and Gorry, 2003; Landsbergen and Wolken, 
2001). 
Additionally, synchronized IT systems inundate DHS analysts with too much 
information. In an attempt to facilitate database interoperability, DHS implemented a 
number of IT systems to simplify information-sharing among components and federal, 
state, local, and tribal partners. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a 
Web-based information portal for sensitive but unclassified information. The Homeland 
Secure Data Network (HSDN) is similar to HSIN but transmits classified information 
(Jackson et al., 2009). In theory, HSIN and HSDN provide appropriate DHS personnel 
with critical homeland security information, but in practice, the systems conflate helpful 





information-sharing has traditionally translated to increasing the volume of information 
moving through a system, but little thought has been given to the quality of the 
information (Jackson et al., 2009). Although false-positives and other data quality issues 
can arise in smaller organizations, the diversity inherent in a larger network with 
disparate authorities and responsibilities could produce significant complications 
(Jackson et al., 2009). If end users are unable to effectively identify and utilize actionable 
intelligence, it undermines the original intent of the synchronized IT systems.    
 
b. Incongruity of Classification Standards 
Classification methodologies vary across departments and agencies. The literature 
suggests that inter-organizational information-sharing can be encumbered by policies that 
prevent government agencies from sharing certain public safety and/or national security 
information (Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Gil-Garcia and Pardo, 2005; Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011). As national security threats evolve, it is imperative that coordination 
between DHS component agencies, law enforcement personnel, first responders, and key 
stakeholders is rapid and reliable. Many government agencies classify information 
according to different standards, and the lack of continuity renders effective information-
sharing very difficult, if not impossible. In many instances, law enforcement personnel 
and first responders who could make the most use of timely intelligence do not have 
access to it. The means do exist whereby knowledge can be shared without needlessly 
endangering sources or methods, but these systems must be refined to work more 





Additionally, the process of obtaining a security clearance is tedious, lengthy, and 
expensive, which further limits the scope of audiences eligible to consume classified 
intelligence. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the 
total number of initial security clearance case investigations pending for more than four 
months increased from 2,526 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to 3,707 in FY 2016. 
Furthermore, in FY 2016, 2,361 security clearance determinations for U.S. government 
employees took longer than one full year to complete (“Fiscal Year 2016 Annual Report 
on Security Clearance Determinations,” 2016). This is frustrating for government 
employees who cannot perform their job functions without a clearance, as well as the tens 
of thousands of state, local, and tribal first responders who neither need nor want a 
clearance (Marks, 2010). Variations in classification methodology coupled with the 
arduous security clearance process inhibit the seamless, dynamic flow of information 
across the homeland security enterprise. 
Furthermore, the over-classification of material prohibits seamless collaboration, 
even among personnel in varying positions of trust. It is logical and necessary to limit the 
dissemination of certain information that may jeopardize U.S. national security interests. 
While an overabundance of caution seems appropriate, it often has an adverse effect on 
the coordination of homeland security efforts. In theory, classification decisions are 
guided by established standards, but in practice, the classification system is sometimes 
used inappropriately and even promiscuously, classifying material too highly or, in some 
cases, classifying material that does not deserve to be classified (Lowenthal, 2006). The 
practice of designating unclassified information as security-sensitive is problematic 





understanding about how to control the classification, no consensus about its implications 
for U.S. national security, and no avenues for redress or adjudication (Carafano and 
Heyman, 2004).  
The instinct to classify material imprisons valuable information within exclusive, 
compartmentalized communities. In FY 2016, 366,948 security clearances were approved 
at the Confidential or Secret level and 227,946 were approved at the Top Secret level. 
These figures represent a 6.9% reduction in the number of security clearances approved 
between FY 2016 and FY 2015 (“Fiscal Year 2016 Annual Report on Security Clearance 
Determinations,” 2016). To put these figures in perspective, the Department of Homeland 
Security alone employed around 240,000 individuals in FY 2015 (“Budget in Brief: 
Fiscal Year 2015,” 2015). Given the disproportionately small number of security 
clearance holders, the over-classification of material results in a largely uninformed 
homeland security enterprise. If critical information is blockaded by bureaucratic hurdles 
and unable to reach frontline personnel in a timely manner, it begs the question: Are the 
Department of Homeland Security’s activities truly informed by a risk-based evaluation 
of intelligence?  
 
c. Overlapping Agency Jurisdictions and Missions  
Many DHS components predate the creation of the Department and thus have 
their own internal collection, analysis, and dissemination practices, which reinforce 
established organizational cultures. Prevalent in the bureaucracy literature is the idea that 
horizontal structures of bureaucracy, such as departmentalization, create obstacles to 





mandates, processes, and expectations (Argote et al., 2000; Willem and Buelens, 2007, 
Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Twenty-one out of twenty-two DHS component agencies 
predate the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and each component has a 
distinct organizational culture and set of norms around the collection, processing, storage, 
analysis, and delivery of intelligence. This has problematic implications because, as 
recognized in the relevant literature, information-sharing can become more complex 
when participating entities’ organizational cultures, norms, origins, and values are 
inconsistent (Drake et al., 2004; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Kellogg et al., 2006; Lam, 2005; 
Pardo et al., 2004; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Importantly, perceptions about individual 
benefits and organizational interests are developed and maintained through organizational 
cultures and values (Jian and Jeffres, 2006; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Thus, 
organizational members’ attitudes and collective behaviors regarding information-sharing 
are closely linked to organizational cultures and values (Constant et al., 1994; Jian and 
Jeffres, 2006).  
As the Department of Homeland Security matured, individual components largely 
retained their respective identities and procedural norms. Researchers acknowledge that 
organizations have greater difficulty pursuing a common objective when they have 
diverse organizational values (Atabakhsh et al., 2004; Fedorowicz et al., 2007; Kim and 
Lee, 2006; Ring and Perry, 1985; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). The lack of cultural 
continuity among component agencies is further exacerbated by DHS’s lack of a 
centralized authority structure. Over the last three years, DHS has attempted to formalize 
intra-component cooperation through its “One DHS” and “Unity of Effort” initiatives, but 





to view the organization holistically, to forcefully communicate the need for cooperation 
among components, and to establish programs or policies that ensure unity, even though 
such effort is a necessary precondition to unified action (“Major Management and 
Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security,” 2017). These 
bureaucratic challenges hinder DHS’s ability to operate as a single entity, hampering the 
Department’s broader efforts to accomplish the homeland security mission effectively. 
Furthermore, component agencies are hesitant to share information that may 
jeopardize a source or method. Law enforcement agents and officers err on the side of 
caution when an informant’s identity is concerned, and for good reason. It often takes 
months or years for agencies to develop a productive relationship with informants, and 
most law enforcement and intelligence organizations are not willing to expose all their 
intelligence beyond their own employees. The recent Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden cases provide strong justification for this practice, as information-sharing 
partners can exploit the exchange relationship and act opportunistically (Steiner, 2015).  
While the fear of leakers is rationally grounded in recent events and institutional 
memory, there are other justifications for withholding information that highlight 
significant mistrust among DHS component agencies. For example, an ICE informant 
may have information that the USCG needs for a tangential criminal case. If ICE allows 
the USCG to solicit information from their informant, that individual may subsequently 
become the crux of the USCG’s criminal case and must testify in court, jeopardizing any 
future work with ICE. This anecdote highlights a critical tension between case-based 
approaches to law enforcement investigations and intelligence investigations—while the 





prosecutions and convictions, the intelligence investigations approach continually revisits 
lines of analysis (Jackson et al., 2009). These inherently oppositional approaches create 
unnecessary divisions in trust and loyalty among DHS components and illustrate how 
bureaucratic competition within the same mission area can make intelligence partners 
less willing to share analytic products, much less raw information (Jackson et al., 2009). 
Likewise, CBP, ICE, TSA, and the USCG share a primary mission to protect the 
border, and all four agencies compete with each other to achieve this mission, to a certain 
degree. Efforts to protect the homeland are contingent upon a robust border security 
strategy that prevents the movement of illicit substances and bad actors while facilitating 
the lawful flow of commerce and peoples. The variance among ports of entry (POEs), 
which include the land, sea, and air domains, necessitates the expertise of multiple DHS 
component agencies to effectively secure the border. In part, the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security was intended to consolidate key border security 
agencies from various Cabinet departments to better integrate the efforts of agencies with 
overlapping missions (Carafano and Heyman, 2004). However, the centralized 
bureaucratic structure arguably had an inverse effect—the number of agencies 
responsible for border, immigration, and transportation security increased to eight, the 
missions of such agencies were not clearly delineated, and the interdependent 
responsibilities of ICE and CBP were formally separated without sufficient justification 
(Carafano and Heyman, 2004).    
Although current domestic intelligence efforts necessitate reliable interagency 
coordination, bureaucratic competition among agencies operating in the same regulatory 





(Jackson et al., 2009). While CBP, ICE, TSA, and the USCG collectively work to prevent 
a myriad of threats from entering and infiltrating the United States, the reality is that 
these component agencies are forced to compete with each other to fulfill their individual 
target performance goals. Despite the fact that CBP, ICE, TSA, and the USCG secure 
different border domains, DHS does not tailor border security performance metrics to a 
large enough degree to reflect the nuances of each agency’s mission.    
For example, CBP is primarily responsible for safeguarding the homeland at and 
in between POEs. One aspect of this responsibility includes preventing the illegal flow of 
people and contraband across about 7,000 miles of land border and, in partnership with 
the USCG, about 95,000 miles of shoreline (Steiner, 2015). Such a daunting task would 
ideally involve seamless cooperation in the land and maritime domain, but CBP and the 
USCG compete with each other in an attempt to reach their respective target metrics for 
interdictions, seizures, apprehensions, etc. per fiscal year. In addition to the USCG, CBP 
also shares performance metrics with ICE. ICE conducts offensive law enforcement 
investigations and operations to supplement the primary defensive role of CBP at the 
border (Steiner, 2015). Additionally, CBP also competes with TSA in their shared 
responsibility of preventing terrorist exploitation of international passenger and 
commercial cargo transportation systems (Steiner, 2015).   
ICE, CBP, and the USCG all rely on intelligence to support their respective law 
enforcement responsibilities. However, this becomes problematic when intelligence is 
valued as a competitive advantage rather than a communal asset (Peled, 2014; Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011). Through the perspective of transaction cost economic theory, incentives 





(Pardo and Tayi, 2007). There are costs associated with gathering information, such as 
time, resources, and personnel. If the benefits of sharing information do not outweigh the 
costs incurred in the collection process, there is often little incentive for agencies to share 
their information with other agencies (Chau et al., 2001; Pardo and Tayi, 2007; Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011). Furthermore, considering that ICE, CBP, and the USCG all compete 
with each other to maximize their respective number of interdictions, arrests, disruptions, 
etc. per fiscal year, there is little incentive for these components to share border security 
intelligence.  
 
d. Overreliance on Outcome-Centric Metrics to Quantify Achievement 
DHS budget requests are heavily influenced by outcome-driven metrics. 
Components leverage their respective numbers of apprehensions, arrests, detentions, 
removals, seizures, disruptions, interdictions, etc. to justify budget increases, indirectly 
prompting fierce competition among agencies to act independently in order to secure 
recognition of achievement. The Department of Homeland Security’s mission is to 
“ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” 
(“Our Mission,” 2016). Due to the gravity of this mission and the persistence of the 
evolving terrorist threat, Congress appropriates billions of dollars each fiscal year to 
support DHS’s component agencies. Justified as the most important mission that any 
government can provide to its people (“Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year 2018,” 2017) the 
Department of Homeland Security’s nearly $65 billion budget per fiscal year is intended 
to fund unceasing agility and vigilance on the behalf of the American people. However, it 





protection, response, and recovery are heavily focused on risk management rather than 
quantifiable outcomes (Jackson, 2014). The fact that terrorists have been unable to 
replicate the devastation caused by the September 11 attacks does not necessarily imply a 
robust homeland security enterprise, nor does it imply money aptly spent. Instead, it 
could indicate that the terror threat is not nearly as severe as we understand it to be. 
While I do not personally agree with this sentiment, it does rightfully challenge the value 
that DHS provides to the American people.  
Each fiscal year, the Department of Homeland Security provides a budget 
justification to Congress to explain its funding priorities and to highlight its contributions 
to the homeland security enterprise. Each component agency communicates their 
respective successes to Congress to justify their added value in the context of the 
overarching DHS mission. However, intelligence expert Gregory F. Treverton (2008) 
acknowledges that there are significant problems with the data that DHS components 
offer to rationalize their efficacy: First, it is difficult to quantify the level of effort going 
into counterterrorism intelligence, as assets support multiple activities. Second, the extent 
of the domestic terrorist threat is impossible to know with any precision, so it is difficult 
to measure effectiveness against the threat. Third, the complexity of the domestic 
intelligence enterprise makes it difficult to determine how capable the country is overall 
at collecting, analyzing, and acting on intelligence information. The pervasiveness of 
unknown or unquantifiable factors severely limits the scope of relevant and appropriate 
metrics to evaluate homeland security efforts. Thus, it is unsurprising that many DHS 






The often-overlooked problem with regard to outcome-centric metrics like drug 
seizures, illegal migrant apprehensions, explosive detections, etc. is that these metrics 
foster competition in a domain that would be better suited for collaboration. It is 
objectively unproductive for the USCG to compete with CBP to interdict a panga boat 
carrying cocaine from Colombia, or for the USSS to compete with ICE to investigate a 
currency counterfeiting scheme in China. The Department of Homeland Security simply 
does not have enough resources or manpower to entertain these overlapping efforts. In 
the private sector, corporations use per-share profits as a reliable success metric, but there 
is no comparable data for DHS, nor is it easy to achieve a consensus on what the outcome 
measures should be and how they might be measured (Jenkins, 2006). 
 
e. Correlation Between Perceived Agency Performance and Annual Budget 
Appropriations  
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process forces 
component agencies to place an extraordinary emphasis on performance targets, which 
diverts necessary resources away from other critically important missions and 
discourages collaboration among components with similar objectives. The Department of 
Homeland Security’s Annual Performance Report is a critical nexus between the 
Department’s priorities and subsequent funding decisions. The Annual Performance 
Report: Fiscal Years 2016-2018 presents the Department’s performance measures and 
applicable results aligned to DHS missions, provides the planned performance targets for 
FY 2017 and FY 2018, and includes information on the Department’s Strategic Review 





2018,” 2017). The Annual Performance Report is organized around missions and goals 
identified in the Department’s FY 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, which incorporate the five 
previously mentioned departmental objectives: (1) Prevent terrorism and enhance 
security, (2) Secure and manage our borders, (3) Enforce and administer our immigration 
laws, (4) Safeguard and secure cyberspace, and (5) Ensure resilience to disasters (“Our 
Mission,” 2016). The DHS performance community, led by the Chief Operating Officer 
(COO), the Performance Improvement Officer (PIO), the Deputy PIO (DPIO), and the 
Assistant Director for Performance Management, employ a tool called the Performance 
Measure Definition Form (PMDF) to annually assess the breadth and scope of publically 
reported performance metrics. These performance metrics are cited directly for the 
Department’s PPBE process and the corresponding Performance Budget. The budgeting 
and programming phases occur concurrently during the PPBE process, and the principal 
outputs of the budgeting phase are the budget justification materials for the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress. The inextricable link between the 
performance community’s annual assessments of DHS’s performance metrics and the 
fiscal year budget process should not be underestimated nor overlooked. Arguably the 
nexus between perceived agency performance and budget appropriations increases the 
transaction costs associated with information-sharing because the possession of 
information is considered to enhance agency performance.  
The performance metrics that inform the PPBE process for DHS agencies 
involved in the domestic IC are largely outcome-centric and emphasize law enforcement 
functions, such as apprehensions, arrests, detentions, removals, seizures, disruptions, and 





environments may be more inclined to pursue their own parochial self-interests and act 
independently rather than prioritize collaborative efforts. The following examples from 
the Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2016-2018 highlight the unintended 
consequences of DHS’s outcome-centric performance metric assessment process: 
i. ICE aims to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) 
and is assessed with the following metrics: “Percent of significant drug 
investigations that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement,” “Percent of 
significant transnational gang investigations that resulted in a disruption or 
dismantlement,” and “Percent of significant child exploitation or child sex 
trafficking investigations that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement.” In FY 
2016, ICE was unable to reach the target percent of drug investigations that 
resulted in a disruption or dismantlement because the agency had reallocated its 
finite resources to address another timely and equally important issue: the opioid 
epidemic. ICE dedicated a sizeable proportion of its counter-drug resources, 
which otherwise would have been utilized to combat TCO activities, to focus on 
the public health crisis caused by increasing abuse of heroin and fentanyl 
(“Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2016-2018,” 2017). Outcome-centric 
performance metrics force component agencies to prioritize certain objectives 
unconditionally, irrespective of emergent threats to the nation’s security and well-
being. Because of the budget implications of the PPBE process, component 
agencies like ICE are not inclined to divest significant resources from activities 
that correspond with APGs, even when such divestments would directly enhance 





performance metrics results in fragmented homeland security activities, as 
agencies are forced to reconcile competing priorities against the backdrop of an 
evolving threat environment.       
     
ii. Although the USSS is primarily responsible for investigating and preventing 
counterfeiting, “the agency’s investigative mission has evolved from enforcing 
counterfeiting laws to safeguarding the payment and financial systems of the 
United States from a wide range of financial and computer-based crimes” (“The 
Investigative Mission,” n.d.). Today, the U.S. Secret Service plays a critical role 
in securing the nation’s critical infrastructure, especially in the realms of cyber, 
banking, and finance. As such, the USSS’s performance metrics reflect the 
agency’s ability to meet certain objectives related to financial cybercrimes, 
including: “Amount of dollar loss prevented by Secret Service cyber 
investigations (in millions),” “Terabytes of data forensically analyzed for criminal 
investigations,” and “Number of cyber mitigation responses.” Although the 
USSS’s investigative mission necessarily expanded to include cybersecurity, the 
agency competes with the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) 
to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure and with ICE to combat cybercrimes. 
The quantity and sophistication of cybercrimes targeting U.S. financial 
institutions requires a whole-of-government approach, but the outcome-centric 
nature of the USSS’s performance metrics discourages the agency from pursuing 
collaborative activities with other component agencies. Because the USSS, 





they compete with each other to achieve their respective performance targets. 
Although the information yielded by USSS investigations would be valuable to all 
three component agencies, it is unsurprising that USSS would forego information-
sharing activities to protect its own self-interests. If the theory of transaction cost 
economics and the theory of reasoned action are applied in tandem to explain why 
the USSS would be inclined to withhold information, it becomes clear that 
bureaucratic competition imposes large transaction costs on information-sharing 
relationships.   
 
iii. CBP, ICE, the USCG, and USCIS all play a key role in preventing the illicit 
movement of people and goods across our nation’s borders while promoting 
lawful entry and exit (“Border Security,” 2017). The applicable performance 
metrics, including “Rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest Border 
between ports of entry,” “Percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions 
resolved along all borders of the United States,” and “Number of smuggled 
outbound weapons seized at the ports of entry” are all used to gauge CBP’s 
effectiveness, though they clearly necessitate a whole-of-government approach. 
The USCG is evaluated by the metric, “Migrant interdiction effectiveness in the 
maritime environment,” which fuels unnecessary competition with CBP’s Air and 
Marine Operations (AMO). Both the USCG and CBP’s AMO are responsible for 
interdictions, yet both sets of performance metrics neglect to incentivize 





Recognizing the significant overlap between the operational 
responsibilities of CBP, ICE, the USCG, and USCIS and the necessity of 
seamless cross-component coordination to achieve Departmental objectives, 
Secretary Jeh Johnson commissioned three DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF) on 
November 20, 2014, in furtherance of a Department-wide Southern Border and 
Approaches Campaign Plan (Johnson, 2014). Joint Task Force East became 
responsible for the southern maritime border and approaches, Joint Task Force 
West became responsible for the Southwest land border and the West Coast, and 
Joint Task Force Investigations became responsible for investigations in support 
of both geographic Task Forces. Importantly, Secretary Johnson directed CBP, 
ICE, the USCG, and USCIS to “realign personnel and stand up headquarters 
capabilities within each Joint Task Force” (Johnson, 2014, p. 3). Secretary 
Johnson also harmonized component agency priorities and performance 
objectives by explicitly directing the Directors of the JTFs to conduct operations 
consistent with the following lines of effort: (1) Reduce the terrorism risk to the 
Nation; (2) Combat transnational criminal organizations; (3) Prevent exploitation 
of legal flows at ports of entry; (4) Counter illegal flows at maritime approaches 
and in between ports of entry; (5) Manage lawful flows of people and goods in 
transit; and (6) Disincentivize illegal border behavior (Johnson, 2014).  These 
JTFs were designed to counteract inter-agency competition between components 
with a stake in border security and “facilitate awareness about cross-component, 
cross-geographic homeland security issues” (“Drug Control: Certain DOD and 





Assess Counterdrug Activities,” 2019, p. 12). Arguably, Secretary Johnson 
recognized that overlapping jurisdictions and missions in the realm of border 
security do not make our borders safer when corresponding performance metrics 
stoke rivalries among component agencies that would otherwise leverage each 
other’s resources and personnel to facilitate a unity of effort.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The Department of Homeland Security was established in the aftermath of the 
September 11 terror attacks, but its bureaucratic structure has not adapted to the new 
realities presented by the diversity of threats to the homeland. Reflecting the evolving 
threat landscape, the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to safeguard the 
country against terrorism has also expanded to include securing our borders, enforcing 
our immigration laws, safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. 
Because DHS’s success is contingent upon effective collaboration between many 
different federal, state, local, tribal, public, private, and international partners, DHS must 
develop structures and processes that provide incentives and rewards for collaboration, 
consultation, and support for implementing key goals.  
Critical to this whole-of-government approach is the remediation of factors that 
inhibit effective information-sharing, the establishment of an incentives system to 
encourage information exchanges, and the adoption of a more fluid intelligence discipline 
that transmits information to end users more quickly. A re-examination of the 
Department’s bureaucratic model could address key problems that inhibit information-





classification standards, overlapping agency jurisdictions and missions, the overreliance 
on outcome-centric metrics to quantify achievement, and the correlation between 
perceived agency performance and annual budget appropriations. The Department of 
Homeland Security has an obligation to strengthen the homeland security enterprise, and 






CHAPTER 3: Case Study 
I. Introduction 
Following the terror attack in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015, 
the federal government initiated an extensive investigation to determine whether other 
terror attacks were imminent. Despite the urgency and gravity of the federal 
investigation, two component agencies within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) failed to share pertinent information with each other in a timely manner, 
jeopardizing the safety and security of the American public. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which 
share responsibility for enforcing U.S. immigration laws, were unable to coordinate 
during an emergency situation and accomplish what DHS was originally designed to 
facilitate—a more unified and streamlined homeland security apparatus.    
This chapter examines the Department of Homeland Security’s response to the 
terror attack in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015 as a case study to test 
the information-sharing and bureaucracy theoretical frameworks established in chapters 1 
and 2. This case study features a clear example of an information-sharing failure between 
two DHS component agencies on hierarchical parity within the broader DHS 
organizational structure. This information-sharing failure is instructive because USCIS 
took three deliberate actions to prevent ICE from obtaining critical information, 
demonstrating unambiguous intent to stymie inter-organizational information-sharing: (1) 
USCIS delayed ICE’s entry into the USCIS facility; (2) USCIS prohibited ICE from 
arresting, detaining, or interviewing anyone in the USCIS facility; and (3) USCIS did not 





is a central focus of this case study because it illustrates how the present structural design 
of the Department of Homeland Security does not incentivize information-sharing 
between component agencies. The actions of at least two DHS component agencies in the 
wake of the December 2, 2015 terror attacks demonstrate the strength of current 
bureaucratic realities in protecting the “turf,” prerogatives, practices of each agency, and 
the absence of true cooperation or collaboration. This conclusion is demonstrated in the 
three specific actions that took place after the attacks. 
For historical context, this chapter begins with a brief description of the evolution 
of the Department of Homeland Security’s organizational structure. Importantly, the 
dismantlement of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the delineation 
of DHS’s immigration enforcement functions across three separate component agencies 
created new bureaucracies where none had existed previously. Next, this chapter 
examines the contemporary relationship between USCIS and ICE with a particular focus 
on persistent management problems that inhibit coordination and information-sharing 
efforts. A substantial amount of analysis is dedicated to USCIS’s Fraud Detection and 
National Security Directorate (FDNS), which was created to facilitate the Joint USCIS-
ICE Anti-Fraud Strategy, an institutionalized interagency process for addressing 
immigration benefit fraud. The complexity inherent in administering and enforcing our 
nation’s lawful immigration system requires an integrated approach, but, as this chapter 
illustrates, the distinct priorities and investigative capabilities of FDNS and ICE detract 
from overarching departmental objectives.  
Ultimately, this case study examines why USCIS would be inclined to withhold 





insight into the following question: How does the organizational structure of the 
Department of Homeland Security influence information-sharing among component 
agencies? Building upon chapters 1 and 2, this chapter assesses how the Department of 
Homeland Security’s centralized bureaucratic model enables and encourages its 
component agencies to pursue their parochial self-interests at the detriment of the 
Department’s overarching mission. These theoretical frameworks provide critical insight 
into the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security’s organizational structure 
institutionalizes interagency competition, thereby reinforcing factors that impede and 
discourage effective information-sharing. 
 
II. Limitations 
Before discussing the merits of this case study, it is important to first 
acknowledge the limitations of this particular topic and methodology. Given the sensitive 
nature of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission and associated activities, a 
large amount of data related to information-sharing practices is classified and therefore 
inaccessible. Moreover, the relevant reports and audits published by oversight agencies 
like the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) are similarly limited in what they can publicly disclose in an unclassified setting. 
While the conclusions drawn by the OIG and the GAO are helpful in bolstering the 
theories underpinning this case study, the analyses set forth in this chapter are admittedly 
devoid of quantifiable data that would otherwise give credibility to the main argument.  
While I am confident that my work and educational experiences have prepared me 





information I simply do not know. For example, I cannot comment definitively on the 
organizational culture of a component agency that I have never personally worked for. 
Nor can I confidently assert that the reports and other publications issued by the 
Department of Homeland Security accurately portray the entirety of what they purport to 
explain. What is not included in government documents can arguably be as important as 
the information the author chooses to include. Realistically, it does not behoove an 
executive branch agency to issue a report that would erode public trust or prompt 
Congressional oversight. It is important to consider that Article I Section 9 of the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress the power to determine both the size and composition of 
appropriations that fund executive branch agencies. Because of the financial influence 
that Congress has over executive branch agencies, one can reasonably conclude that the 
Department of Homeland Security would be incentivized to issue reports that 
characterize its activities in a positive light.  
Another limitation of this case study stems from the absence of research dedicated 
to measuring the effectiveness of information-sharing efforts, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Given that information is an ambiguous concept and that information can exist in both 
explicit and implicit forms, there is no uniform approach or metric to evaluate the 
efficacy of information-sharing practices. Aside from objective observations about 
whether information-sharing did or did not occur in a specific context, there are limited 
avenues by which one can assess information exchanges (or the lack thereof) in an 
empirical way. Moreover, the value of information-sharing endeavors cannot be 
measured simply by the successful transmission of information across organizational 





effectively within the organization that acquired it (Jackson, 2014; Yang and Maxwell, 
2011). Fundamentally, information is shared not for its own sake but in the pursuit of a 
mission. Therefore, in this case study, effective information-sharing among DHS 
component agencies is defined as an activity that helps to “ensure a homeland that is safe, 
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our Mission,” 2016).  
 
III. Background 
 Fourteen months after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Congress passed the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to further coordinate and unify national homeland 
security efforts. The Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107-296) formally established 
the Department of Homeland Security as a Cabinet-level department with a primary 
mission of protecting the American homeland. As outlined in President George W. 
Bush’s proposal (Bush, 2002), the organizational structure of the Department of 
Homeland Security was initially designed to reflect four key departmental objectives: (1) 
Border and Transportation Security; (2) Emergency Preparedness and Response; (3) 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; and (4) Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The following organizational chart (Figure 1) 
from President Bush’s proposal illustrates the hierarchy of the nascent homeland security 









The duties and responsibilities of several former agencies were transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security, resulting in the most substantial reorganization of the 
federal government since the 1940s (“Management Challenges Remain in Transforming 
Immigration Programs,” 2004). Importantly, responsibility for immigration enforcement 
functions was transferred from the Department of Justice’s INS to the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 effectively dismantled the INS 
and separated the agency into three new components within DHS: USCIS, ICE, and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The following diagram (Figure 2) illustrates the 
transfer of immigration functions from INS to DHS: 
 
 
Figure 1. DHS Organizational Chart (June 2002). 









In 2004, the GAO reported that USCIS, ICE, and CBP were continuing to 
experience management challenges that were previously pervasive within INS. 
Importantly, these challenges persisted in spite of the decentralization of INS’s 
immigration authorities across three separate component agencies. According to the 
report, these INS management challenges included “a lack of clearly defined priorities 
and goals; difficulty determining whom to coordinate with, when to coordinate, and how 
to communicate; and inadequately defined roles resulting in overlapping responsibilities, 
inconsistent program implementation, and ineffective use of resources” (“Addressing 
Management Challenges That Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies,” 2005, p. 1). In 
fact, the GAO issued seven reports from 1997 to 2002 that identify persistent 
management challenges impeding INS’s ability to effectively enforce immigration law.1 
                                                          
1 See Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement 
Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002); Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is 
Needed to Address Problems, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002); INS’s Southwest Border 
Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain after Seven Years, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 
2001); Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, 
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001). Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational 
Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000); Criminal 
Aliens: INS’s Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb., 25, 1999); and Criminal Aliens: INS’ Efforts to Identify and Remove 
Imprisoned Aliens Need to be Improved, (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997) 
Figure 2. Reorganization of INS into DHS (May 5, 2005). 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2005). Department of Homeland 
Security: Addressing Management Challenges That Face Immigration Enforcement 





Soon after Michael Chertoff was sworn in as the second Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2005, he initiated a “comprehensive review of the 
Department’s organization, operations, and policies” (“The Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations,” 2005). This review, known as the Second Stage Review or 
2SR, involved an evaluation of DHS’s organizational structure to assess whether the 
Department's policies, operations, and structures aligned in the best way to address 
present and future threats (“Department Six-point Agenda,” 2015). The 2SR produced a 
Six-point agenda for the Department of Homeland Security, which proposed realigning 
the DHS organizational structure to maximize mission performance (“Department Six-
point Agenda,” 2015). Despite concerns about the disaggregation of DHS’s immigration 
responsibilities across multiple agencies, Secretary Chertoff retained the three separate 
immigration component agencies in the new organizational structure (Wasem, 2007). In 
his 2SR remarks on July 13, 2005, Secretary Chertoff explained that a flatter bureaucracy 
would improve DHS’s “ability to coordinate and carry out operations,” and announced 
that “all seven primary operational components of this Department will have a direct line 
to the Secretary” (“U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second Stage Review 
Remarks,” 2005). Accordingly, Secretary Chertoff eliminated the Border and 
Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) and elevated CBP and ICE to hierarchical 
parity with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Secret Service 





Coast Guard (USCG). The following organizational chart (Figure 3) illustrates the 
structure of the Department of Homeland Security after the 2SR reorganization: 
 
 
Structurally, the reorganization streamlined the chain of command for all three 
operational components with immigration enforcement functions. The Director of 
USCIS, the Commissioner of ICE2, and the Commissioner of CBP all serve with the 
same rank under the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. In a sense, the 
2SR reorganization recreated the cohesiveness of the INS by placing USCIS, ICE, and 
                                                          
2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently led by a Director, not a 
Commissioner. 
Figure 3. DHS Organizational Structure After 2SR (July 27, 2005). 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). Brief Documentary History of the 






CBP on the same lateral plane. However, the delineation of immigration responsibilities 
across three separate agencies means that no single agency has full responsibility or 
accountability for overarching immigration policy. The question remains, Does this 
bifurcation of responsibility yield a more focused and concerted approach to specific 
immigration functions, or does it complicate the chain of command and foster 
competition between component agencies with distinct yet interrelated priorities?  
   
IV. The Contemporary Relationship Between USCIS and ICE    
The organizational structure that resulted from the 2SR largely mirrors the 
organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security today. Although USCIS 
and ICE are both vestiges of the INS, both agencies have evolved over time and adopted 
their own respective cultures and priorities. Since 2003, USCIS and ICE have operated 
independently to accomplish their distinct missions. The mission statements of both 
agencies reflect their unique areas of responsibility within the broader concept of 
immigration enforcement. USCIS “administers the nation’s lawful immigration system, 
safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for 
immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring 
our values” (“Mission Statement,” 2018). ICE’s mission is to “protect America from the 
cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security and public 
safety” (“What We Do,” 2018). Both agencies are charged with ensuring the integrity of 
our nation’s immigration system, but recent evidence shows that USCIS and ICE do not 





In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
conducted an audit “to determine whether DHS fosters collaboration and unity of effort 
department-wide to enforce and administer immigration law and policy” (Roth, 2017, p. 
12). The OIG concluded that ICE and USCIS continue to experience immigration 
enforcement and administration challenges despite departmental efforts to establish a 
“Unity of Effort,” as described in chapter 2. Importantly, the OIG determined that both 
agencies’ persistent management problems are directly correlated with the organizational 
structure of the Department of Homeland Security. According to the audit, “Challenges 
related to the evaluation of immigration outcomes, the affirmative asylum application 
process, and cross-component coordination difficulties existed because no specific 
department-level group is responsible for addressing overarching component immigration 
challenges” (Roth, 2017, p. 3).  
The central difference between the organizational structure of the INS and the 
organizational structure of DHS’s immigration responsibilities today is the 
decentralization of authority and oversight. In a sense, the organization of the Department 
of Homeland Security’s immigration functions encourages individual agencies to 
prioritize their respective responsibilities at the detriment of broader, departmental goals. 
Prevalent in the bureaucracy literature is the idea that horizontal structures of 
bureaucracy, such as departmentalization, create obstacles to information-sharing 
between different component agencies because of varying functional mandates, 
processes, and expectations (Argote et al., 2000; Willem and Buelens, 2007; Yang and 
Maxwell, 2011). When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 decentralized INS’s 





functions within a new centralized structure, USCIS and ICE inherited distinct yet 
critically interrelated elements of that broader authority. Now, both components must 
balance their own respective priorities as well as the Department’s overarching 
immigration authority with finite resources and manpower.  
Although the OIG contends that the management challenges experienced by 
USCIS and ICE are linked to the organizational changes brought on by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, the OIG stipulates that “Nothing in the Act would prohibit greater 
cross-component coordination and unity of effort with respect to immigration” (Roth, 
2017, p. 3). While the OIG correctly points out that the provisions within the Homeland 
Security Act in and of themselves do not directly impair unity of effort, the Act 
fundamentally decentralized the Department’s immigration authorities and created new 
bureaucracies where none had existed previously. As such, it is reasonable to question 
whether the Department’s immigration responsibilities are best served by a centralized 
immigration agency like INS or a decentralized network of three separate immigration 
bureaucracies like USCIS, ICE, and CBP.       
With regard to the relationship between bureaucracy and information-sharing, 
scholars like Peled (2014) argue that government agencies must be coerced to share 
information because bureaucracies are explicitly designed to counteract inter-
organizational information-sharing. He maintains that the institutional features of the 
U.S. federal government, such as regulations, oversight mechanisms, and organizational 
cultures, are intended to frustrate integration and prevent organizations from becoming 
too powerful (Peled, 2014). Moreover, information flows are strictly regulated in the 





Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Arguably, the multiple layers of bureaucracy inherent in 
DHS’s organizational structure stifle opportunities for information-sharing between 
component agencies like USCIS and ICE because components have relatively little 
incentive to overcome the ‘institutional features of the U.S. federal government’ (Peled, 
2014) that frustrate coordination. This problem is compounded by the fact that no specific 
department-level group is responsible for oversight of overarching component 
immigration challenges, such as information-sharing (Roth, 2017). Without incentives or 
an oversight body to encourage cross-component information-sharing, it is unsurprising 
that the Department of Homeland Security has difficulty coercing USCIS and ICE to 
share information voluntarily.  
To counteract cross-component coordination hurdles posed by DHS’s centralized 
bureaucratic structure, USCIS established the Fraud Detection and National Security 
(FDNS) Directorate to “ensure immigration benefits are not granted to individuals who 
pose a threat to national security or public safety, or who seek to defraud our immigration 
system” (“Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate,” 2015). Previously, there 
were no formal cross-component strategies or institutionalized processes for addressing 
benefit fraud (Skinner, 2007). In a 2005 Conference Report, Congress articulated its 
intent that FDNS would be responsible for “developing, implementing, directing, and 
overseeing the joint CIS3-ICE anti-fraud initiative, and conducting law 
enforcement/background checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to 
granting any immigration benefits” (Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, 2004, p. 74). Accordingly, 
FDNS and ICE established a formal partnership and implemented a Joint Anti-Fraud 
                                                          





Strategy through FDNS. USCIS describes this partnership as a necessary division of 
interrelated responsibilities: “FDNS pursues administrative inquiries into most 
application and petition fraud, while ICE conducts criminal investigations into major 
fraud conspiracies” (“Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate,” 2015). The 
Joint Anti-Fraud Strategy promotes a balanced and coordinated operation that 
distinguishes USCIS’s administrative authority from ICE’s investigative authority.  
In 2010, FDNS was elevated to Directorate status, which significantly raised the 
profile of fraud detection and national security work within USCIS. This structural 
change was intended to prompt operational enhancements and improve “the integration 
of the FDNS mission in all facets of the agency’s work” (“Fraud Detection and National 
Security Directorate,” 2015). As the prominence of FDNS dramatically increased, its 
mission of detecting, deterring, and combatting fraud evolved to place greater emphasis 
on national security challenges and threats to public safety in the immigration benefits 
process (“Annual Report 2018,” 2018). For example, former USCIS Director Leon 
Rodriguez described FDNS’s work as fulfilling “the USCIS mission of enhancing both 
national security and the integrity of the legal immigration system” (“The Security of 
U.S. Visa Programs,” 2016). FDNS supports these new priorities by, among other things, 
“acting as USCIS’s primary conduit for information sharing and collaboration with other 
governmental agencies” (“Privacy Impact Assessment,” 2014, p. 2). As USCIS’s 
principal liaison to law enforcement and intelligence partners involved in combatting 
immigration benefit fraud, FDNS plays a critical role in determining what information is 
shared with ICE and when such information-sharing exchanges occur. The discretion 





V. San Bernardino Terror Attack 
On December 2, 2015, Sayed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, 
carried out an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired attack at the Inland Regional 
Center (IRC) in San Bernardino, California that left 14 people dead and 22 injured. 
Following the attack, authorities initiated a broad federal investigation to determine “the 
identity of those involved or whether further attacks were planned” (Roth, 2016, p. 2). 
Soon after, law enforcement personnel discovered that Enrique Marquez, Farook’s friend 
and long-time neighbor, purchased the Oracle Rifle and the Smith and Wesson Rifle that 
Farook had used in the attack (United States of America v. Enrique Marquez Jr., 2015). 
At approximately 12:20 p.m. on December 3, 2015, the San Bernardino Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) provided crucial information regarding Marquez’s location 
to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the investigative arm of ICE (Roth, 2016). 
The JTTF developed information that Marquez’s wife, Mariya Chernykh, had an 
appointment at 12:30 p.m. on December 3, 2015, at the San Bernardino USCIS facility 
(Roth, 2016). The JTTF believed that Marquez would accompany Chernykh, a Russian 
national attempting to adjust her immigration status, to the USCIS facility. Following up 
on the information from the JTTF, HSI dispatched a team of five agents dressed in 
tactical gear to the USCIS facility (Roth, 2016).  
At approximately 12:30 p.m., the HSI agents arrived at the USCIS facility and 
informed the Federal Protective Service (FPS) of their official purpose. The FPS guards 
“advised the HSI agents that they had to stay in the lobby until the Field Office Director 
approved their entry,” (Roth, 2016, p. 3) despite the urgency of the matter. The HSI 





to a conference room. The HSI agents waited an additional 10 minutes before the USCIS 
Field Office Director arrived to meet with them (Roth, 2016).  
Although HSI vocalized concerns that Marquez could be connected to the prior 
day’s terror attack and that he could be in the USCIS building with weapons and 
explosives, the Field Office Director insisted that she contact her superiors for guidance 
before permitting the agents to enter the building. Citing USCIS policy, the Field Office 
Director told the HSI agents that they were “not allowed to arrest, detain, or interview 
anyone in the building” (Roth, 2016, p. 4). The agents also spoke with the FDNS Acting 
Chief, Los Angeles, who relayed the same message over the phone (Roth, 2016).  
After HSI’s futile attempt to enter the USCIS facility, the agents requested a copy 
of Chernykh’s Alien Registration File, or A-file. The Field Office Director refused to 
give the HSI agents Chernykh’s A-file and, according to the agents, was not forthcoming 
with the material in the file (Roth, 2016). HSI asked for known addresses, but the Field 
Office Director only confirmed the address provided by the agents (Roth, 2016). The 
Field Office Director refused to offer more information: “HSI believed that the Field 
Office Director was not going to cooperate in their effort to locate Marquez, so they left 
the building and regrouped in the parking lot” (Roth, 2016, p. 5). More than an hour after 
HSI agents first arrived at the USCIS facility, the Field Office Director agreed to discuss 
Chernykh’s A-file with the HSI agents. Importantly, the Field Office Director refused to 
give HSI a copy of the file and only allowed the agents to hand-copy information under 







VI. Congressional Oversight 
At some point before March 15, 2016, a whistleblower contacted the office of 
Senator Ron Johnson, the Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, to inform him of the lack of coordination between USCIS and ICE in the 
aftermath of the San Bernardino terror attack. Chairman Johnson subsequently invited the 
Honorable Leon Rodriguez, the Director of USCIS, and the Honorable Sarah Saldaña, the 
Director of ICE, to testify before the Committee at a hearing titled, The Security of U.S. 
Visa Programs. During the hearing, Chairman Johnson criticized USCIS for failing to 
facilitate information-sharing processes in the midst of a national security emergency: 
“So, we had a team, armed up and, potentially, dealing with a terrorist. They had a tip 
from the FBI that Mr. Marquez might be at the USCIS facility and the officer in charge of 
USCIS—the officers would not allow HSI into the building and would not give them the 
A-file. That is not indicating a great deal of cooperation between two different agencies 
under DHS, whose supposedly top concern is the security of this Nation” (“The Security 
of U.S. Visa Programs,” 2016). Chairman Johnson rightfully points out that the 
Department of Homeland Security’s overarching mission is undermined when component 
agencies are unable to effectively share information. Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, echoed Chairman Johnson’s dismay, stating, “This is a 
classic example of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing in the Obama 
Administration’s Department of Homeland Security… Agents we depend on to keep us 
safe, especially hours after a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, were blocked by officials 
within their own agency from conducting a routine law enforcement action to prevent a 





The events that transpired on December 3, 2015 at the San Bernardino USCIS 
facility triggered widespread criticism of the Department of Homeland Security’s ability 
to carry out its foundational missions, including preventing terrorism and enhancing 
security; managing our borders; administering immigration laws; securing cyberspace; 
and ensuring disaster resilience (“Our Mission,” 2016). Luckily, the bureaucratic turf war 
between two Department of Homeland Security component agencies merely resulted in a 
delayed investigation as neither Chernykh nor Marquez showed up for the appointment. 
However, it begs the question, Is the structure of the Department of Homeland Security 
conducive to cross-component information-sharing, a critical process underlying the 
Department’s key missions?  
 
VII. Case Study 
In hindsight, we are very lucky that Marquez did not play a bigger role in the 
terror attack that occurred at the IRC on December 2, 2015. While Marquez and 
Chernykh’s intentions were unknown at the time of ICE’s visit to the USCIS facility, 
HSI’s precautionary investigation into Marquez on December 3, 2015 was ultimately 
warranted. Enrique Marquez was later charged with a variety of terrorism-related 
offenses and eventually pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) and false statements in connection with the 
acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (United States of America v. 
Enrique Marquez Jr., 2017).  
Had Marquez and Chernykh conspired with Farook and Malik to carry out 





been ill-prepared to connect the dots ‘left of boom.’ Fundamentally, the lack of 
coordination between USCIS and ICE impeded the Department’s ability to “ensure a 
homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our 
Mission,” 2016). Particularly damning is the fact that this information-sharing failure was 
intentional. USCIS deliberately withheld information from another component agency 
similarly responsible for immigration and homeland security functions during a national 
security emergency. As such, the crux of this case study is an examination of the three 
actions taken by USCIS on December 3, 2015 in San Bernardino that demonstrate an 
intent to withhold information from ICE. In the following paragraphs, the predominant 
theories underpinning the diverse array of information-sharing and bureaucracy literature 
are applied to these actions in the context of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
broader organizational structure.  
USCIS took three distinct actions on December 3, 2015 to prevent ICE from 
obtaining critical homeland security information in a timely manner: (1) USCIS delayed 
ICE’s entry into the USCIS facility; (2) USCIS prohibited ICE from arresting, detaining, 
or interviewing anyone in the USCIS facility; and (3) USCIS did not share a tangible 
copy of Mariya Chernykh's A-file with ICE agents. 
 
1. USCIS delayed ICE’s entry into the USCIS facility. 
When five HSI agents dressed in tactical gear arrived at the USCIS facility and 
stated their official purpose, they should have been granted permission to enter the 
building immediately. The agents lost invaluable time when FPS and USCIS confined 





minutes while they waited to meet with the Field Office Director in the conference room 
(Roth, 2016). Especially during a fluid investigation, this type of lackadaisical response 
from USCIS is both inappropriate and potentially dangerous. The seemingly innocuous 
issue of timeliness is a symptom of bureaucratic inefficiency and must be examined in the 
context of the situation.  
When HSI initially encountered the FPS contract guards and explained their 
official purpose, the question of authority prompted a chain reaction among USCIS 
personnel: First, the FPS guard located the Field Office Director and informed her that 
“HSI agents were looking to obtain information regarding a Russian female and Hispanic 
male who may have been connected to the shootings the previous day” (Roth, 2016, p. 3). 
Next, the Field Office Director contacted her superior, the District Director of USCIS in 
Los Angeles. The District Director then notified her supervisor, the USCIS Regional 
Director in Laguna Nigel (Roth, 2016). In the meantime, the HSI agents spoke with the 
FDNS Acting Chief over the telephone.  
The inefficiencies highlighted by this lengthy process illustrate how the formal 
hierarchical structure of bureaucracy can create barriers that frustrate an organization’s 
information-sharing activities (Creed et al., 1996; Tsai, 2002). In bureaucratic 
organizations, power and authority are centralized in upper management tiers (Hall and 
Tolbert, 2004; Kim and Lee, 2006; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). This becomes more 
complicated when we consider how power and authority are centralized in multi-
component organizations, such as the Department of Homeland Security. Kim and Lee 
(2006) argue that centralization can reduce the likelihood that information-sharing occurs 





approval from upper management tiers before any action is taken. In context of this case 
study, four individuals were involved in USCIS’s decision-making process: the Field 
Office Director, the District Director, the Regional Director, and the FDNS Acting Chief. 
A critical element of homeland security information-sharing is timeliness, and the fact 
that four individuals in four separate USCIS offices were consulted before a decision was 
made demonstrates that centralization can prolong vertically imposed bureaucratic 
processes. In the homeland security information-sharing environment, time simply cannot 
be compromised because lives are often at stake.  
To justify her course of action on December 3, 2015, the Field Office Director 
insisted that she had the explicit authority to regulate who could enter the USCIS facility, 
including law enforcement personnel (Roth, 2016). Simply, that is factually incorrect—
there is no law, regulation, procedure, or policy to support the Field Office Director’s 
claim. Even if the Field Office Director truly believed that she had such authority, what 
would motivate her to delay ICE’s entry during a national security emergency? The 
theory of reasoned action is widely accepted in social psychology to explain human 
behavior and can be a useful model to explain information-sharing behaviors in 
organizations (Davis et al., 1989). The theory of reasoned action assumes that individuals 
are rational and will make logical use of the information available to them (Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 1975; Bock and Kim, 2001). Arguably, a rational individual responsible for 
ensuring “a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other 
hazards” (“Our Mission,” 2016) would make a reasonable effort to assist federal officers 





That said, the theory of transaction cost economics builds on the theory of 
reasoned action and introduces the idea that individuals are both rational and self-
interested. Even when information-sharing is framed in the context of contributing to a 
collective good, the decision is ultimately a calculation of the perceived costs and 
benefits (Jian and Jeffres, 2006; Marks et al., 2008). The Field Office Director’s decision 
to intentionally delay ICE’s entry into the USCIS facility indicates that she perceived the 
cost of information-sharing to be greater than the benefits it would yield. Since 
information-sharing behaviors are influenced not only by personal motivations but also 
by contextual forces (Yoo and Torrey, 2002), it is critical to consider how the 
organizational culture of USCIS, the operational relationship between USCIS and ICE, 
and other contextual factors may have influenced the Field Office Director’s calculation. 
If we apply the theory of transaction cost economics and the theory of reasoned action in 
tandem to explain why USCIS would delay ICE’s entry, it becomes clear that 
bureaucratic competition imposes large transaction costs on information-sharing 
relationships.  
 
2. USCIS prohibited ICE from arresting, detaining, or interviewing anyone in the 
USCIS facility.  
There is considerable evidence to support the claim that USCIS made a concerted, 
systemic effort to prevent the HSI agents from ensuring “a homeland that is safe, secure, 
and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our Mission,” 2016). On more than 
one occasion, USCIS officials propagated the false narrative that USCIS policy does not 





(Roth, 2016). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1589a, HSI agents may “make an arrest without a 
warrant for… a felony, cognizable under the laws of the United States committed outside 
the officer’s presence if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed or is committing a felony” (19 U.S.C. § 1589). Given the JTTF’s 
notification to ICE of the location of a person of interest in an ongoing terror 
investigation, HSI had sufficient legal authority to perform law enforcement functions 
within the USCIS facility.  
Importantly, at least two USCIS Directorates and Program Offices intentionally 
mischaracterized USCIS’s policy and procedure to prevent ICE from carrying out its law 
enforcement authority during a national emergency. In addition to the Field Office 
Director, the FDNS Acting Chief played a significant role in USCIS’s systematic efforts 
to maintain information asymmetry over ICE. The Acting Chief’s role in the events that 
transpired on December 3, 2015 is particularly damning because he had previously 
worked for HSI (Roth, 2016). As a former HSI employee, the FDNS Acting Chief should 
be knowledgeable about, or at least aware of, HSI’s law enforcement authorities. In his 
interview with the OIG, the Acting Chief denied having any role in the information-
sharing failure and stated that “he was well aware that USCIS could not supersede HSI 
law enforcement authority, nor could USCIS provide direction as to how HSI conducted 
law enforcement operations” (Roth, 2016, p. 4). The Acting Chief’s account was not 
corroborated by anyone else interviewed by the OIG, and we can reasonably conclude 
that he lied to cover up a decision that he knew was wrong.  
Given that FDNS is “USCIS’s primary conduit for information-sharing and 





2), why would the Acting Chief knowingly prevent ICE from executing its criminal 
investigative authority to obtain time-sensitive information? The answer to this question 
is intricately related to the contemporary relationship between FDNS and ICE. FDNS and 
ICE work together through the framework of the Joint Anti-Fraud Strategy to detect and 
prevent immigration benefit fraud. Although the Strategy is intended to delineate 
“USCIS’s administrative authority, responsibility, and jurisdiction from ICE’s criminal 
investigative authority” (“Privacy Impact Assessment,” 2014, p. 2), the reality is that 
USCIS is reluctant to cede its comprehensive investigative authority to ICE even for the 
sake of national security. In Homeland Security Delegation No. 0150.1 paragraph (I), the 
Secretary of Homeland Security delegated the following authority to USCIS: “Authority 
to investigate alleged civil and criminal violations of the immigration laws, including but 
not limited to alleged fraud with respect to applications or determinations within the 
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) [predecessor to USCIS] and 
make recommendations for prosecutions or other appropriate action when deemed 
advisable” (“DHS Delegation No. 0150.1,” 2003). Moreover, Congress explicitly 
authorized USCIS to “to conduct law enforcement and background checks on every 
applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner” (“Privacy Impact Assessment,” 2014, p. 8) in the 
2005 Conference Report. In addition to administrative investigations, USCIS clearly has 
the statutory authority to conduct criminal investigations in furtherance of its fraud 
detection mission.  
Given that USCIS and ICE have overlapping criminal investigative authorities 
and jurisdictions with regard to immigration benefit fraud, it is unsurprising that the 





(2009) argue that bureaucratic competition among agencies operating in the same 
regulatory environment can reduce the likelihood that individuals will share information. 
A closer look at the standard operating procedures governing FDNS’s fraud investigation 
process illustrates why formal information-sharing frameworks are not immune to inter-
agency competition. Figure 4 is a simplified flow chart that shows, among other things, 












































Figure 4. FDNS Fraud Investigation Flow Chart (June 28, 2018). 






According to Figure 4, if FDNS determines that a fraud referral warrants further 
investigation, it will initiate an administrative investigation into the implicated case. If 
FDNS uncovers information during the course of the administrative investigation that 
justifies a criminal investigation, FDNS refers the case to ICE. The chronology of this 
process is important because the standard operating procedures “set forth the guidelines 
for the receipt, documentation, investigation, and recording of the results of investigative 
action for either criminal investigation referral to ICE or administrative investigation to 
remain within USCIS” (“The Aftermath of Fraud by Immigration Attorneys,” 2012). If 
FDNS refers a case to ICE for criminal investigation, FDNS must suspend its 
administrative adjudication of the matter.  
 In theory, FDNS’s administrative investigations should complement (and contrast 
with) ICE’s criminal investigations into suspected immigration benefit fraud. However, 
in practice, this is not necessarily the case. Dan Cadman, a former INS and ICE official 
with over 30 years of government experience, recently published an article titled, “Is 
USCIS Incrementally Recreating the INS?,” that provides evidence that USCIS is 
“quietly building its own investigative corps” (Cadman, 2018). Specifically, Cadman 
argues that the decentralization of INS’s immigration authorities across three separate 
component agencies catalyzed a power imbalance between USCIS and ICE. The 
following excerpt from Cadman’s article illustrates how the post-INS organizational 
structure of the Department of Homeland Security fosters competition rather than 
cooperation between USCIS and ICE: 
The result of stove-piping all three organizations is that USCIS has been unable to 





agency was left in the unenviable position of having to send referrals to ICE for 
actual investigation of cases. In the 15 years since the creation of DHS and its 
organizations, though, ICE has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to accept all 
but a few referrals, and then only when they appear to constitute large-scale 
frauds or conspiracies. Of course in the investigative and law enforcement world, 
sometimes small violations grow into large investigations, but in the absence of 
anyone to look into the ‘small’ stuff, that doesn't happen. That ICE expects 
complex investigative work to be handed to them on a platter defies the logic of 
bureaucracies, any bureaucracies. Anyone that spends that much effort on 
something will fight like hell not to give it away (Cadman, 2018). 
As a former INS and ICE official, Cadman can credibly comment on the relationship 
between USCIS and ICE with the advantage of hindsight and personal experience. There 
are three key points in the above excerpt that provide excellent insight into the 
organizational cultures of both USCIS and ICE, and perhaps more importantly, that help 
to explain why USCIS would not be inclined to share information with ICE.  
First, Cadman proposes a causal relationship between the disaggregation of the 
INS and the notion that “USCIS has been unable to actually do much about fraud other 
than deny applications here and there” (Cadman, 2018). There is merit to this argument, 
as USCIS must outsource its criminal investigations to agencies with law enforcement 
authority, such as ICE, in order to accomplish FDNS’s fundamental mission. Cadman 
describes USCIS as being in an “unenviable position” because the agency is relatively 
powerless to combat serious cases of immigration benefit fraud without its own criminal 





and law enforcement activities in the homeland security effort is highlighted in chapter 2. 
The same principle applies in this case—splitting the law enforcement functions 
(criminal investigations) and the intelligence functions (administrative investigations) 
will lead both agencies fighting the war on terrorism (USCIS and ICE) with one hand tied 
behind their backs. Former FBI Director Robert Mueller’s argument is particularly 
poignant: “The distinct advantage we gain by having intelligence and law enforcement 
together would be lost in more layers and greater stovepiping of information” (“Law 
Enforcement and the Intelligence Community,” 2004). 
 Second, Cadman claims that ICE’s reluctance to accept referrals from USCIS 
fundamentally impairs USCIS’s ability to carry out its mission, forcing USCIS to bolster 
its own investigative capabilities to compensate for ICE’s minimal cooperation. FDNS’s 
administrative investigations lay the groundwork for ICE’s criminal investigations, which 
are an integral step in the overarching Joint Anti-Fraud Strategy. Given that ICE has 
“repeatedly shown an unwillingness to accept all but a few referrals, and then only when 
they appear to constitute large-scale frauds or conspiracies,” (Cadman, 2018) it is 
unsurprising that USCIS is pursuing other avenues to initiate criminal investigations. 
From a macro perspective, interagency cooperation is necessary for FDNS, which does 
not have law enforcement authority, to accomplish its core mission. In theory, the 
delineated process illustrated by Figure 4 is designed to ensure consistent detection, 
documentation, and prevention of immigration benefit fraud (“The Aftermath of Fraud by 
Immigration Attorneys,” 2012). However, in practice, this process is undermined by self-
interest. Like all DHS component agencies, ICE has limited resources and is only willing 





chief performance metric used to evaluate HSI’s contribution to the overarching ICE 
mission—“Percent of significant Homeland Security Investigation cases that result in a 
disruption or dismantlement” (“FY 2017-2019 Annual Performance Report,” 2018)—
explicitly incentivizes HSI to prioritize large-scale crimes and conspiracies. 
Fundamentally, HSI’s self-interest materially impairs FDNS’s ability to “determine 
whether individuals or organizations filing for immigration benefits pose a threat to 
national security, public safety, or the integrity of the nation’s legal immigration system” 
(“Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate,” 2015).  
 Third, Cadman offers a compelling explanation for why USCIS would 
intentionally withhold information from ICE in spite of their necessary partnership. 
Absent a reliable path to pursue criminal investigations, FDNS began bolstering its own 
workforce capacity to circumvent ICE’s institutional roadblock. Between FY 2012 to FY 
2018, FDNS staffing levels grew from 756 authorized positions to 1,548 authorized 
positions—a nearly 205% spike (“Annual Report 2018,” 2018). Additionally, the USCIS 
Strategic Plan explicitly documents USCIS’s intent to strengthen its investigative 
capabilities. To advance a more systematic approach to mitigating fraud risks, USCIS 
will “Enhance our technological and analytical capabilities to identify non-obvious 
relationships and patterns of malfeasance related to immigration benefit fraud and 
communicate insights to our government partners” (“USCIS Strategic Plan,” 2016, p. 5). 
It is clear that USCIS is seeking to reduce its dependency on ICE by augmenting its own 
capabilities, indicating that the agency is actively pursuing strategies to make itself more 
autonomous. The Strategic Plan unambiguously cites USCIS’s relationship with ICE 





specifically confirms that USCIS will “Examine existing models for interagency fraud 
referrals and explore alternate referral opportunities” (“USCIS Strategic Plan,” 2016, p. 
5). Cadman insightfully points out that USCIS’s motivation for advancing its internal 
investigative capabilities stems from inefficiencies connected to the Department of 
Homeland Security’s bureaucratic structure: “That ICE expects complex investigative 
work to be handed to them on a platter defies the logic of bureaucracies, any 
bureaucracies. Anyone that spends that much effort on something will fight like hell not 
to give it away” (Cadman, 2018).  
 The fraught relationship between FDNS and ICE is exacerbated by an 
organizational structure that arbitrarily separates administrative functions from 
investigative functions. The complexity inherent in administering and enforcing our 
nation’s lawful immigration system requires an integrated approach, but the distinct 
priorities of FDNS and ICE detract from overarching departmental objectives. Moreover, 
the distinct priorities of FDNS and ICE likely influenced the FDNS Acting Chief’s 
decision to prohibit ICE from arresting, detaining, or interviewing anyone in the USCIS 
facility. Considering the fact that FDNS is aggressively bolstering its internal 
investigative capacity and actively pursuing a strategy to reduce its dependency on ICE, it 
makes sense that the Acting Chief was unwilling to accommodate HSI’s investigation on 
December 3, 2015. In the context of information-sharing, the degree to which 
organizations are dependent on their partners for resources can explain such 
organization’s willingness to share information (Patnayakuni et al., 2006).   
Resource dependence theory acknowledges that organizations are dependent on 





environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In the case of FDNS, we can 
easily point to its sustained efforts to boost investigative capacity as evidence of its 
broader strategy to reduce environmental uncertainty. One could also argue that the 
FDNS Acting Chief prevented HSI from carrying out its law enforcement authorities in 
an attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty. Because FDNS and ICE operate in 
overlapping jurisdictions and regulatory environments, they compete for similar 
resources, such as information and funding. The information-sharing literature 
acknowledges the connection between resources and power, and scholars contend that 
owning information within an organization translates to owning power within an 
organization (Ardichvill et al., 2003; Kolekofski and Heminger, 2003; Marks et al., 
2008). More importantly, resource dependence theory suggests that organizations will 
often attempt to assert control over resources to both reduce others’ power and increase 
their own power over others (Hillman et al., 2009). Arguably, this case study is a premier 
example of an agency asserting control over resources to maintain a favorable power 
relationship. On December 3, 2015, the FDNS Acting Chief assumed the unofficial role 
of information gatekeeper for the express purpose of regulating HSI’s access to valuable 
resources in USCIS’s possession. The Acting Chief went so far as to invoke authority he 
did not have to prevent ICE from gaining a competitive advantage.  
The FDNS Acting Chief went to great lengths to preserve USCIS’s exclusive 
access to information about Marquez and Chernykh because information, ultimately, is 
an important resource and source of power (Pfeffer, 1981). As FDNS continues to fortify 
its criminal investigative capacity, it will increasingly compete with HSI for power and 





immigration responsibilities. Of all people, the FDNS Acting Chief would be acutely 
aware of that reality.  
 
3. USCIS did not share a tangible copy of Mariya Chernykh's A-file with ICE 
agents.  
In addition to being denied access to the USCIS facility, the HSI agents were also 
denied access to Mariya Chernykh's A-file, as well as any other pertinent information 
about her. The Field Office Director deliberately withheld the A-file from ICE without 
any legal or procedural reason for doing so. Furthermore, USCIS had previously 
determined that such law enforcement information-sharing was a “routine use” and thus 
permissible pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7). The OIG concurred and noted that “HSI 
is, and always has been, able to obtain USCIS immigration files without approval by any 
particular authority” (Roth, 2016, p. 7). If there was clear precedent indicating that 
USCIS could share A-files with ICE, why did the San Bernardino terror attack prompt a 
departure from the norm?  
The fact that USCIS and ICE routinely exchange A-files demonstrates that the 
information-sharing failure that occurred on December 3, 2015 was not due to an 
innocuous logistical or technological error. Rather, it suggests that the information-
sharing failure was a direct result of individual motivations and self-interest. In fact, 
Chairman Johnson confirmed the influence of individual motivations and self-interest at 
the highest levels of USCIS hierarchy in the oversight hearing titled, The Security of U.S. 
Visa Programs. Chairman Johnson informed USCIS Director Leon Rodriguez of 





the gathering of information process that the decision not to let HSI in came from higher 
up” (“The Security of U.S. Visa Programs,” 2016). When asked to explain the role that 
USCIS leadership played in the information-sharing failure, Director Rodriguez admitted, 
“Unfortunately, it all happened so quickly that it was, incorrectly, perceived as our folks 
trying to, in some way, obstruct what ICE was trying to do” (“The Security of U.S. Visa 
Programs,” 2016). Unconvinced by Director Rodriguez’s feeble justification, Chairman 
Johnson explicitly stated, “It sounds like they were prevented,” and ICE Director Sarah 
Saldaña agreed: “I will say, in all honesty, Senator, that I had a similar reaction when I 
first heard about the incident” (“The Security of U.S. Visa Programs,” 2016). While 
Director Rodriguez excused the information-sharing failure as a simple error exacerbated 
by the chaos of the situation, the Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee and the Director of ICE refused to exonerate USCIS leadership on 
those grounds.       
Cress and Kimmerle (2006) posit that information-sharing presents a social 
dilemma. Social dilemmas are situations where personal interests are inconsistent or 
incompatible with collective interests. When confronted with a social dilemma, 
individuals are more likely to prioritize their short-term personal interests than long-term 
organizational interests (Dawes, 1996; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). If we examine the 
events that occurred at the IRC through the lens of a social dilemma, we can reasonably 
conclude that the Field Office Director, the FDNS Acting Chief, and other USCIS 
employees identified significant costs associated with sharing Chernykh's A-file with 
ICE. To be clear, USCIS ultimately calculated that such costs outweighed the potential of 





homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our 
Mission,” 2016) in favor of individual interests points to a significant flaw in the 
Department of Homeland Security’s organizational design. Despite the fact that the 
Department of Homeland Security was specifically designed to encourage information-
sharing, there is no institutionalized incentive system to counteract the social dilemma 
presented by information-sharing.   
Many public-sector organizations, such as the Department of Homeland Security, 
create information as their core product, provide information to the public as their main 
activity, or employ workers to develop information as their primary responsibility 
(Starbuck, 1992; Willem and Buelens, 2007). In this environment, the transmission and 
exchange of information takes on a more transactional role. In spite of the transactional 
qualities of an information-sharing framework, the issue of ownership presents a 
challenging problem. Employees create, organize, and amass tangible information goods 
and services, but organizations ultimately own these products. Moreover, organizations 
expect employees to extract utility from these products to benefit the organization as a 
whole (Constant et al., 1994). With respect to Mariya Chernykh's A-file, the information 
belongs to the Department of Homeland Security and should not have been subject to 
individual motivations and self-interest. Scholars suggest that the degree to which 
employees believe in organizational ownership (rather than individual ownership) 
strongly influences the likelihood that information-sharing occurs (Jarvenpaa and Staples, 
2001; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). This case study illuminates how the Department of 
Homeland Security’s organizational structure, which features a complex network of 





The DHS organizational chart depicted in Figure 3 shows that USCIS employees 
are governed by two distinct bureaucracies: the USCIS hierarchy and the overarching 
Department of Homeland Security hierarchy. In terms of chain of command, it is clear 
that the Secretary of Homeland Security outranks the USCIS Director and is the ultimate 
authority for all Department and component agency matters. However, most DHS 
employees rarely interface with Department leadership, are not directly involved in the 
operations of other component agencies, and do not have a stake in the well-being of 
other component agencies. In spite of the hierarchical supremacy of the Department’s 
overarching mission and objectives, DHS employees are primarily loyal to the missions 
and priorities of their respective component agencies.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
In the wake of the devastating terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush proposed to create the Department of Homeland Security, the 
most significant transformation of the U.S. government since the 1940s. President Bush 
recognized that the evolving threat landscape necessitated a more agile, unified 
government structure that could better protect the homeland and the American people:     
The changing nature of the threats facing America requires a new government 
structure to protect against invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of 
weapons. Today no one single government agency has homeland security as its 
primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed 
among more than 100 different government organizations. America needs a 





today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the 
future. (Bush, 2002).  
The Department of Homeland Security was explicitly designed to facilitate cooperation 
and coordination among the numerous government agencies with a stake in the homeland 
security mission. Moreover, the structure of DHS was intended to reflect the dynamic 
environment in which it operates. However, since its inception, the Department of 
Homeland Security has been largely unable to overcome the same problems that both 
preceded and prompted its creation.  
The San Bernardino terror attack is a high-profile case that can be reasonably 
extrapolated to explain systemic information-sharing challenges within the Department of 
Homeland Security. In the aftermath of the one of the deadliest terror attacks on U.S. soil 
since September 11, 2001, USCIS failed to share critical information about a potentially 
dangerous person of interest with ICE. More importantly, this failure was not merely the 
result of an administrative error or a technological malfunction. USCIS deliberately 
withheld information from ICE despite the fact that individuals associated with the 
person of interest “had committed an atrocity on an unthinkable scale against unarmed 
innocents” less than 24 hours before (Roth, 2016, p. 6). This case study is illustrative of 
the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security’s organizational structure 
institutionalizes interagency competition, thereby reinforcing factors that impede and 
discourage effective information-sharing.       
On December 3, 2015, USCIS personnel took three distinct actions to stonewall 
ICE: (1) USCIS delayed ICE’s entry into the USCIS facility; (2) USCIS prohibited ICE 





did not share a tangible copy of Mariya Chernykh's A-file with ICE agents. Each of these 
actions was inconsistent with USCIS policy and procedure, yet each action was 
sanctioned by a high level USCIS official. In a clear dereliction of duty, the Field Office 
Director and the FDNS Acting Chief willfully mischaracterized the authorities vested in 
them by USCIS in pursuit of self-interest. Self-interest, ultimately, is what undermines 
the unity of effort that the centralization of twenty-two disparate agencies was intended to 
foster.  
 This case study illustrates how the Department of Homeland Security’s 
organizational structure creates a disincentive for cross-component collaboration and 







Chapter 1 determined that the value of information is relative to its user, and that 
the transfer and exchange of information is a source of competitive advantage in a 
knowledge economy (Haas and Hansen, 2007). In a knowledge economy, such as the 
homeland security enterprise, individuals may seek to control information to protect their 
own self-interests rather than the interests of the organization. Chapter 2 presented a 
variety of factors—including overlapping missions, interagency competition, and the 
nexus between performance metrics and budget appropriations—that stymie information-
sharing activities among DHS component agencies. These factors are evident in the case 
study and give credence to the notion that centralization fosters a culture of competition 
rather than collaboration. Chapter 3 established that DHS employees are primarily loyal 
to the missions and priorities of their respective component agencies. The Department of 
Homeland Security’s organizational structure institutionalizes interagency competition 
and sanctions the pursuit of self-interest, thereby creating a disincentive for cross-
component collaboration and information-sharing. 
The centralized organizational structure of the Department of Homeland Security 
fundamentally undermines information-sharing efforts among component agencies. 
Because twenty-one out of twenty-two DHS component agencies predate the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security, centralization resulted in a heterogeneous 
bureaucracy with inconsistent organizational values, organizational priorities, and 
organizational processes. Centralization also forced component agencies to both retain 
legacy mandates and adopt broader departmental mandates. In this sense, centralization 





priorities and departmental responsibilities. Thus, as evidenced by this case study, DHS’s 
centralized organizational structure enables component agencies to pursue their parochial 
self-interests at the detriment of the Department’s overarching mission. Absent an 
incentive to prioritize departmental objectives over individual interests, component 
agencies will continue to align resources and information-sharing activities with self-
interest. Self-interest ultimately, is what undercuts the unity of effort that the 
centralization of twenty-two disparate agencies was intended to foster.  
Furthermore, because information-sharing presents a social dilemma, self-interest 
directly impacts a component agency’s willingness to share information. When 
confronted with a social dilemma, individuals are likely to favor short-term personal 
interests over long-term organizational interests (Dawes, 1996; Yang and Maxwell, 
2011). Accordingly, the case study demonstrates how the centralized organizational 
structure of the Department of Homeland Security is overshadowed by component 
agency self-interest. USCIS’s willful neglect of its role to ensure “a homeland that is safe, 
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards” (“Our Mission,” 2016) in favor 
of personal interests points to a significant flaw in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s organizational design. Despite the fact that the Department of Homeland 
Security was specifically designed to encourage information-sharing, there is no 
institutionalized incentive system to counteract the social dilemma presented by 
information-sharing. Assuming that individuals are rational and self-interested, even 
when information-sharing is framed in the context of contributing to a collective good, 
the decision is ultimately a calculation of the perceived costs and benefits (Jian and 





Because DHS’s success depends on critical relationships with many different 
federal, state, local, tribal, public, private, and international partners, DHS must develop 
structures and processes that provide incentives and rewards for collaboration, 
consultation, and support for implementing key goals. Critical to this whole-of-
government approach is the remediation of factors that inhibit effective information-
sharing, the establishment of an incentives system to encourage information exchanges, 
and the adoption of a more fluid intelligence discipline that transmits information to end 
users more quickly. To conclude, I offer five recommendations to aid in the 
establishment of an incentives system: 
 
1. Develop Performance Metrics that Measure Inter-Agency Collaboration 
The Department of Homeland Security’s outcome-centric performance metrics do 
not adequately capture the extent to which cross-component collaboration and 
information-sharing efforts are successful. The relative success of information-sharing 
endeavors cannot be measured simply by the successful transmission of information 
across organizational boundaries; it is also important to assess whether the information is 
absorbed and utilized effectively within the organization that acquired it (Jackson, 2014; 
Yang and Maxwell, 2011). To incentivize inter- and intra-organizational information-
sharing, the Secretary of Homeland Security should create metrics for each component 
agency that measure the degree to which inter-agency collaboration solves major 
problems. The Secretary should seek to emulate the information-sharing metrics that 
govern the three DHS JTFs because such performance measures are “intended to better 





and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better 
Assess Counterdrug Activities,” 2019, p. 25).  
DHS JTF performance metrics have evolved significantly since FY 2017 to 
prioritize “strategic-level coordination” among component agencies and no longer focus 
on outcome-centric activities, “such as the amounts of drugs seized, arrests made, and 
currency seized” (“Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should 
Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities,” 2019, p. 
25). Moreover, the evolution of JTF information-sharing measures critically addressed 
the self-interest and personal motivations that otherwise guide component agency 
activities: “For example, a new JTF performance measure developed for fiscal year 2018 
included the number of leads that the JTFs provided to a partner law enforcement agency, 
DHS component, or foreign government partner for interdiction or investigative action.” 
The following DHS JTF FY 2018 metrics should be used as guidance for broader DHS 
applicability: 
• Number of operations executed against TCOs with assistance or coordination 
limited to DHS components 
• Number of joint intelligence products initiated or enhanced in alignment with 
the JTF operational priorities 
• Number of supportive efforts provided to or in response to a partner agency, 
component, or foreign partner that are for awareness only 
• Number of supportive efforts provided to a partner agency, component, or 





• Number of individuals who satisfactorily completed a joint training event 
provided by their respective JTF 
• Number of marketing efforts provided to stakeholders regarding JTF 
capabilities, capacities, or processes for awareness, collaboration, cooperation, 
and relationship building (“Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task 
Forces Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess 
Counterdrug Activities,” 2019, p. 26). 
By assigning performance value to inter-agency information-sharing processes, 
information-sharing will become an activity that correlates directly with broader 
organizational success.  Furthermore, “Task force officials reported that the task forces 
coordinated effectively with each other when they had shared purposes and overlapping 
or shared geographical boundaries. Because outcome-centric evaluation measures place a 
disproportionate emphasis on the products of information-sharing and largely ignore the 
processes that yielded the successful transfer (Yi, 2009; Huysman and de Wit, 2002), the 
DHS JTF performance metrics quantify inter-agency collaboration as the desired 
outcome.  
 
2. Foster a Cooperative and Social Work Environment 
The degree to which an individual views his or her relationship with colleagues as 
cooperative or competitive can significantly influence information-sharing behaviors. 
Steinel, Utz, and Koning (2010) compared the impacts of incentives based on group-
performance and incentives based on individual performance. They determined that 





and competitively motivated individuals were more likely to withhold information from 
others. Ultimately, cooperative work environments and cooperative interpersonal 
relationships incentivize reciprocal information-sharing behaviors. Recent studies suggest 
that information-sharing between organizations is heavily influenced by good inter-
organizational relationships based on core features like trust, commitment and shared 
vision (Li and Lin, 2006).  
Moreover, in addition to cooperation, scholars have noted the importance of 
social relationships as a motivational mechanism (Kim and Lee, 2006; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003). Interpersonal interactions are thought to have an indirect influence on 
individual motivation to share and receive information (Geen, 1991). Information-sharing 
is a fundamentally social process, and individuals engaging in information exchanges are 
likely to be motivated by social factors that emerge from the process and relationship. 
Specifically, several researchers found that social networks help to generate positive 
attitudes about the sharing of information and knowledge within an organization. (Kim 
and Lee, 2006; Kolekofski and Heminger, 2003; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Highly 
social work environments bolster the relationships needed to motivate people to engage 
in helping and sharing behavior (Smith and McKeen).  
 
3. Integrate Standard Operating Procedures 
Processes, best practices, and standard operating procedures are key pillars of an 
organization’s culture, and incorporating information-sharing into such routines can help 
solidify its role in the organization. Supplementing these processes with metrics that 





collaborative behavior. Standard operating procedures reflect organizational values, and 
embedding the importance of information-sharing in routine business practices can 
promote collaborative behaviors in both the organizational culture and the workplace 
(Smith and McKeen). Training is another avenue by which the value of information-
sharing can be emphasized. If employees are taught the appropriate protocols and 
understand the behaviors that are expected of them, they will be more motivated to 
replicate the behavior (Smith and McKeen).    
 
4. Focus on Culture 
Organizational culture is an effective motivator because it can powerfully 
influence human behavior (Smith and McKeen). Work environments that integrate 
information-sharing into functional culture will provide platforms for individual growth 
as well as organizational growth. When an organizational culture promotes fairness, 
affiliation, and innovation, it can positively influence an individual’s intentions to share 
information (Bock et al., 2005). Moreover, organizational culture is intimately related to 
social networks, as social interactions can influence or drive changes in organizational 
culture (Smith and McKeen). Organizational culture also shapes the degree to which 
information-sharing resonates in the hearts and minds of people in the organization 
(Smith and McKeen). Concerted efforts to develop new organizational culture 
mechanisms can also foster greater information-sharing capacity. Fundamentally, if the 
organizational culture embraces information-sharing as a central activity, individuals will 





behavior, the organizational culture must offer a compelling vision of how information-
sharing will improve the future (Smith and McKeen).     
 
5. Embolden Managers to be Motivators 
Motivating staff is a daunting task, but a concerted effort to influence mid-level 
managers can help transform organizational cultures. Managers play a critical role in 
stimulating and sustaining information-sharing activities (Smith and McKeen). Moreover, 
managers have a considerable amount of influence within their respective organizations 
and are in positions to modify organizational processes. Motivating mid-level managers 
to share information can function as a force multiplier because employees look to 
managers to lead by example. Additionally, managers are in an optimal position within 
the organization to recognize subordinates for exhibiting good information-sharing 
behavior. Managers’ opinions have significant value, and consistent communication from 
managers about the impact that information-sharing activities have on organizational 
performance will motivate employees to continue to prioritize such behaviors.    
  
Structural reform alone is insufficient—the Department of Homeland Security 
must supplement its centralized organizational structure with an incentives system to 
promote effective, timely, and generous information-sharing among component agencies. 
Importantly, the incentives system must be embedded within each component agency’s 
standard processes and procedures to ensure that information-sharing is engrained in each 
agency’s organizational culture. Because the institutional features of the U.S. federal 





intended to frustrate cross-component information-sharing efforts, the Department of 
Homeland Security must overhaul these institutional features to incentivize collaborative 
activities. By developing performance metrics that measure inter-agency collaboration, 
fostering a cooperative and social work environment, integrating standard operating 
procedures, focusing on culture, and emboldening managers to be motivators, DHS 
leadership can counteract the powerful influence that self-interest has on component 
objectives. As evidenced by this paper, self-interest, ultimately, is what undercuts the 
unity of effort that the centralization of twenty-two disparate agencies was intended to 
foster.  
If the Department of Homeland Security’s centralized organizational structure is 
supplemented with an incentives system that encourages components to prioritize 
departmental objectives over individual interests, the Department’s information-sharing 
capacity will become one of its greatest assets. The key to a “single, unified homeland 
security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible 
enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future” (Bush, 2002) is unencumbered 
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Customs, Immigration, & Cross-Border Operations Manager           Jan. 2019 - Present 
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 Liaise with U.S., Canadian, and Mexican government agencies dealing with customs, immigration, 
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